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Abstract 
This thesis analyses and discusses some of the substantial changes brought 
about for the field of fundamental rights by virtue of the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty 1 December 2009; Art. 6(1) to the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), according to which the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFREU) “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties” 
and Art. 6(2) TEU according to which “The Union shall accede to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.” (ECHR) The focus of this thesis is the effects of these changes 
for the level of protection of fundamental rights within Europe and the 
autonomy of the EU legal order.  
In order to estimate how the level of protection of fundamental rights 
and the autonomy of EU law have been affected by the Charter’s legal 
status, it is necessary to analyse the general provisions governing the 
interpretation and application of the Charter (Art. 51-53 CFREU). The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has in the recent cases 
Melloni, Åkerberg Fransson and Toshiba Corporation to a certain extent 
clarified Art. 51-53 CFREU. It appears that the CJEU has interpreted Art. 
51 on the Charter’s field of application extensively. By contrast, it has 
interpreted Art. 52(3) on the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR 
a partially autonomously in relation to the principle of ne bis in idem. It is 
unclear how to interpret Art. 53 CFREU but it is certain that it does not 
allow any deviation from the principle of supremacy. In my view, the CJEU 
should not have interpreted Art. 51 as extensively as it did in Åkerberg 
Fransson because of the quite clear phrasing of the provision - that the 
Charter shall only apply when Member States are implementing EU law. As 
far as I am concerned, it was reasonable of the Court to choose a partially 
autonomous interpretation of Art. 52(3) and not interfere with the non-
consensus among the Member States in relation to the ne bis in idem 
principle as enshrined in ECHR, as it would involve the risk of rendering 
the Charter dependent on an international agreement. It is unsurprising that 
the CJEU did not accept an interpretation of Art. 53 that allows deviation 
from the principle of supremacy of EU law over national law. In my view, 
this approach is justified, as disturbance of this well-established principle 
would endanger the autonomy of EU law and prevent it from applying 
uniformly throughout the Union. In my opinion, the fact that the Charter has 
become legally binding enhances the level of protection of fundamental 
rights in Europe. By review of the Charter’s content, it is clear that it draws 
upon various fundamental rights instruments and contains several rights that 
are not enshrined in the ECHR.  
The negotiation process on the EU’s accession to the ECHR started in 
March 2010 and the last Draft agreement from June 2011 was finalized in 
April 2013. The task of integrating the two judiciaries has been difficult. 
The fact that an external court will be able to review EU measures causes 
issues for the autonomy of the EU legal order. For this reason, Protocol No. 
8 relating to Art. 6(2) requires that the Draft agreement “shall make 
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provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union 
law”. By review of the case law and opinions of the CJEU, it appears that 
the “specific characteristics” relates to the autonomy of EU law. Moreover, 
this protocol stipulates that nothing in the Draft agreement shall affect Art. 
344 to the Treaty on on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
according to which national courts are prevented from submitting any case 
concerning EU law to an external court. The requirement relating to Art. 
344 TFEU addresses the need to preserve to the key functions and the 
autonomy of the CJEU. The final version of the Draft agreement contains a 
number of mechanisms that seek to strike the balance between preserving 
the specific characteristics of EU and EU law without compromising the 
autonomy of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the level of 
protection of fundamental rights. The prior involvement mechanism allows 
the ECtHR to ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in so far an alleged 
violation of the ECHR concerns EU law. The co-respondent mechanism 
allows the EU and its Member State(s) to be co-respondents in proceedings 
where a EU institution has adopted a EU measure, that a Member State has 
implemented, which is alleged of violating ECHR. The provision on Inter-
Party complaints will amend the current provision on Inter-State complaints 
in Art. 33 ECHR to include the EU and its Member State(s). I am of the 
opinion that these mechanisms together strike the desired balance of 
preserving the autonomy of EU law, the CJEU’s and the ECtHR’s key 
functions. For instance, the prior involvement mechanism preserves an 
essential feature of EU law. The mechanism appears to mirror the 
preliminary ruling procedure, according to which Member States can refer 
cases to the CJEU insofar they contain EU law, which preserves the CJEU’s 
function of being the only court that can declare EU measures to be invalid.  
The mechanisms have also managed to place the EU on equal footing with 
the other Contracting Parties. For example, they have included the EU and 
its Member State in proceedings under Art. 33 ECHR. The co-respondent 
mechanism is an appropriate solution on how to integrate the EU in 
proceedings where an alleged violation of the ECHR has its origin in EU 
law. It allows the issuing institution, as well as the implementing Member 
State, to be co-respondents to the proceedings. It succeeds in doing so 
without requiring the ECtHR to interpret EU law in a binding manner, 
decide the Member States obligations under EU law or decide where the 
alleged violation took place. To conclude, accession of the EU to the ECHR 
will preserve the autonomy of EU law as well as the central functions of the 
CJEU and the ECtHR, because of these mechanisms and because of the fact 
that the ECtHR is of subsidiary character.  Moreover, accession will lead to 
an enhancement of the level of protection of fundamental rights within 
Europe as two obvious judicial gaps will be closed; henceforth the ECtHR 
will be able to scrutinize EU cats and hold the EU responsible for violations 
of the ECHR. 
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Sammanfattning 
I detta examensarbete analyseras och diskuteras de omfattande förändringar 
inom rättsområdet grundläggande rättigheter som följt efter att 
Lissabonfördraget trädde i kraft den 1 december 2009. Arbetet är avgränsat 
till att beskriva de förändringar som art. 6.1 och art. 6.2 i Fördraget om 
Europeiska Unionen (FEU) inneburit. Enligt art. 6.1 ska den Europeiska 
Unionens Stadga om de Grundläggande Rättigheterna (Stadgan) ges “samma 
rättsliga värde som fördragen” och enligt art 6.2 ska EU ansluta sig till den 
Europeiska Konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna (EKMR). 
Arbetets fokus är att diskutera effekterna av art. 6.1 och 6.2 för skyddsnivån 
av de grundläggande rättigheterna samt dess konsekvenser för EU:s och dess 
rättsordnings autonomi.  
För att kunna bedöma hur skyddsnivån och EU:s rättsordnings 
autonomi påverkas krävs en analys av Stadgans allmänna bestämmelser om 
tolkning och tillämpning (art. 51-53). De nyligen utkomna rättsfallen Melloni, 
Åkerberg Fransson och Toshiba Corporation har i viss mån belyst art. 51-53. 
EU-domstolen tolkade art. 51 om stadgans tillämpningsområde extensivt i 
Åkerberg Fransson. Art. 52.3 om stadgans förhållande till EKMR verkar 
däremot ha givits en delvis autonom tolkning i relation till principen om ne 
bis in idem i Åkerberg Fransson och Toshiba Corporation. Det är oklart hur 
art. 53 ska tolkas efter genomgång av Melloni, men det är uppenbart att 
bestämmelsen inte tillåter någon avvikelse från principen om EU-rättens 
företräde framför nationell rätt. Enligt min mening skulle EU-domstolen inte 
ansett sig ha jurisdiktion i fallet Åkerberg Fransson på grund av det mycket 
tydliga ordvalet att stadgan endast ska gälla när medlemsstaterna 
implementerar EU-rätt. Jag anser att det var klokt av EU-domstolen att välja 
en delvis autonom tolkning av art. 52.3 och inte lägga sig i bristen av 
konsensus mellan medlemstaterna i relation till principen om ne bis in idem i 
EKMR, eftersom det skulle innebära en risk att stadgans bindande kraft skulle 
bli beroende av ett internationellt avtal. Det var föga förvånande att EU-
domstolen inte skulle acceptera en tolkning av art. 53 som tillät avvikelse från 
principen om EU-rättens företräde framför nationell rätt. Detta är enligt min 
åsikt helt riktigt, eftersom att rucka på denna väletablerade princip skulle 
äventyra EU rättens autonomi och förhindra dess uniforma tillämpning i EU.  
Att Stadgan har blivit rättsligt bindande ökar rättsskyddet i Europa eftersom 
den innefattar ett antal rättigheter som inte omfattas av EKMR.  
Förhandlingsprocessen om EU:s ansluting till EKMR började i mars 
2010 och det sista Anslutningsavtalet från juni 2011 slutfördes i april 2013. 
Uppgiften att integrera de två domstolarna har varit svår. Faktumet att en 
extern domstol kommer att kunna granska EU-rätt innebär uppenbarligen 
problem för EU:s rättsordnings autonomi. Därför stipulerar Protokoll (8) till 
FEU att Anslutningsavtalet ska “avspegla nödvändigheten i att bevara 
unionens och unionsrättens särdrag.” Mot bakgrund av EU-domstolens 
rättspraxis och beslut framstår det som att dessa ”särdrag” relaterar till EU:s 
och dess rättsordnings autonomi. Vidare stipulerar protokollet att 
Anslutningsavtalet inte ska påverka art. 344 i Fördraget om Europeiska 
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Unionens Funktionssätt (FEUF). Enligt denna bestämmelse förbjuds 
nationella domstolar från att hänföra tvister som rör EU-rätt till en extern 
domstol. Hänvisningen till art. 344 relaterar till EU-domstolens 
huvudfunktioner och dess autonomi i relation till Europadomstolen. Den 
senaste versionen av Anslutningsavtalet innehåller ett antal mekanismer som 
syftar till att uppnå en balans av att bevara EU:s och EU-rättens särdrag utan 
att äventyra Europadomstolens själständighet eller skyddsnivån av 
grundläggande rättigheter i Europa. The prior involvement mechanism 
möjliggör att Europadomstolen kan be EU-domstolen om ett 
förhandsavgörande, förutsatt att tvisten omfattar EU-rätt. The co-respondent 
mechanism möjliggör att EU och dess medlemsstater tillsammans kan vara 
parter i förhandlingar där en medlemsstat har implementerat ett EU direktiv 
utfärdat av en EU institution som har anklagats för att bryta mot EKMR.  
Inter-Party complaints kommer att ändra den nuvarande bestämmelsen om 
Inter-State complaints i art. 33 EKMR så att bestämmelsen efter anslutning 
kommer att inkludera EU och dess medlemsstater. Jag anser att de här tre 
mekanismerna tillsammans uppnår balansen av att bevara EU:s och dess 
rättsordnings autonomi, EU-domstolens och Europadomstolens centrala 
funktioner och leder till en ökad skyddsnivå av grundläggande rättigheter 
inom Europa. Mekanismerna har bevarat viktiga element av EU rätt. The 
prior involvement mechanism speglar möjligheten för nationella domstolar att 
begära EU-domstolen om förhandsavgörande såvida tvisten rör tolkningen av 
EU-rätt vilket gör att EU domstolen förblir den enda domstol som kan 
förklara EU bestämmelser ogiltiga. Mekanismerna har även givit EU samma 
skyldigheter som de övriga anslutande parterna. Exempelvis har de inkluderat 
EU och dess medlemsstater i förfarande under art. 33 ECHR. The co-
respondent mechanism är en utmärkt lösning som möjliggör att både EU- 
institutionen som utfärdat ett direktiv som anklagas för att strida mot EKMR 
och medlemsstaten som implementerat det kan vara parter i förhandlingar 
utan att Europadomstolen ska behöva tolka EU bestämmelser på ett bindande 
sätt, avgöra medlemsstaternas skyldigheter under EU rätt eller bedöma var 
exakt det påstådda brottet mot konventionen inträffade. Sammanfattningsvis 
kommer EU:s anslutning till EKMR att delvis på grund av ovan nämnda 
mekanismer men också eftersom Europadomstolen är av subsidiär karaktär att 
bevara EU:s och dess rättsordnings autonomi, EU-domstolens och 
Europadomstolens centrala funktioner.  Vidare kommer anslutningen att leda 
till en förbättring av skyddsnivån för grundläggande rättigheter i Europa 
eftersom två uppenbara juridiska brister kommer att åtgärdas. Efter anslutning 
kommer EU bestämmelser att kunna granskas av Europadomstolen och EU 
kommer att kunna hållas ansvaring för brott mot EKMR. 
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1 Introduction   
1.1 Background 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 1 December 2009 has 
brought about substantial changes for the autonomy of EU law in the field 
of fundamental rights. For this reason, it is of great relevance to assess ‘the 
shape of things to come’ for the field of fundamental rights in Europe as 
well as the autonomy of EU legal order. The autonomy of the EU legal 
order in this field of law has two dimensions:  external autonomy in relation 
to international law (notably the ECHR) and internal autonomy with regard 
to fundamental rights as protected by the national constitutions of the EU 
Member States. In this sense, the CJEU is fighting a “two front battle,” with 
the constitutional courts of the EU Member States on the one hand, and the 
ECtHR on the other hand. The internal dimension may have been affected 
by article 6(1) TEU, according to which the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union has acquired legal status. The external dimension has 
been affected by Art. 6(2) TEU, according to which the EU is under the 
obligation to accede to the ECHR. Discussion on the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR has been continuing for over thirty years. As of today, the main 
obstacles have been removed and it appears that the thirty-year long struggle 
to reach an agreement on the terms of accession will soon come to an end. 
The EU’s accession to the ECHR will have substantial effects for the 
autonomy of the EU legal order, which has been a major obstacle to 
reaching an agreement on the terms of accession. This is particularly as 
following accession, the EU institutions will be exposed to external control 
by the ECtHR. It has been a difficult task for the drafters to preserve the 
specific nature of the EU and satisfy political demands while simultaneously 
ensuring a sufficient level of protection of fundamental rights. One of the 
main arguments in favour of accession has been that it would legitimize the 
EU’s commitment to protect fundamental rights. However, the EU had 
already a very dignified fundamental rights record despite the absence of an 
EU catalogue of fundamental rights. Prior to the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU developed fundamental rights through general 
principles by drawing inspiration from the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case 
law. It is therefore questionable whether accession will have any substantial 
effects on the CJEU’s case law on fundamental rights when the ECHR 
transforms into a formal source of law.  
 Another consequence of the Lisbon Treaty is that the EU henceforth 
has a legally binding catalogue of rights of its own. The Charter contains a 
provison on corresponding rights and the explanatory notes to the Charter 
encourage reference to the ECtHR’s case law. By review of the CJEU’s case 
law on fundamental rights since the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, two 
lines of case law can be discerned. On the one hand, for most rights 
enshrined in the ECHR as well as the Charter, the CJEU continues to refer 
to the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law, ensuring that rights in the CFREU 
that correspond to rights in the ECHR are given the same interpretation. On 
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the other hand, in certain recent cases by the CJEU, the absence of reference 
to the convention and the ECtHR’s case law is remarkable. It seems as if the 
right in question has been given a different scope and meaning en EU law 
than the corresponding right guaranteed by the ECHR. It is questionable 
whether this absence of reference convey that the ECHR and CFREU are 
autonomous instruments, or that the two fundamental rights catalogues are 
converging. Furthermore, the field of fundamental rights is one of the few 
fields where the constitutional courts of the Member States still dispute the 
principle of supremacy of EU law. Does the Charter enhance fundamental 
rights to the extent that, where the national standard is higher, an EU law 
provision might have to give way to a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
national constitution of the Member State? In other words, does it allow 
Member States to deviate from the principle of supremacy of EU law? The 
CFREU is the most modern fundamental rights catalogue of the world 
whereas the ECHR is by now over sixty years old. The CFREU contributes 
with several novelties and encompasses the changes in and developments of 
the society. However, the CJEU have continuously been accused of 
compromising the level of fundamental rights for economic and political 
objectives, and it is doubtful that the existence of an EU legally binding 
fundamental rights catalogue will dramatically change its tendency to 
compromise fundamental rights. Overall, what does the most modern 
fundamental rights catalogue of the world bring about for the protection of 
fundamental rights within Europe?  
1.2 Purpose and question formulations  
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyse the most significant 
changes brought about by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty for the 
autonomy of the EU legal order in the field of fundamental rights and the 
level protection of fundamental rights within Europe. The most fundamental 
changes are; the Charter becoming legally binding pursuant to Art. 6(1) 
TEU and; the EU’s accession to the ECHR pursuant to Art. 6(2) TEU.  
In order to analyse the effects of the Charter legal status for the internal and 
external dimension of the autonomy of the EU legal order as well as the 
level of protection of fundamental rights within Europe, I will specifically 
address the following questions:  
 
In the light of the cases Melloni, Toshiba and Åkerberg Fransson, how 
should the general provisions governing the interpretation and application 
of the Charter (Art. 51-53 CFREU) be understood? How have these 
provisions affected the internal and external dimensions of the autonomy of 
EU law? How has the Charter becoming a legally binding document 
affected the level of protection of fundamental rights within Europe?  
 
Subsequently, for the purpose of analysing the effects of the EU’s accession 
to the ECHR for the external dimension of the autonomy of the EU legal 
order, I will specifically address the following questions:  
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Does the final Draft agreement on accession succeed in preserving the 
autonomy of the EU legal order and the key functions of the CJEU? What 
effects will accession of the EU to the ECHR have for the level of protection 
of fundamental rights within Europe? 
1.3 Method and material  
For the purpose of this thesis, I have used a traditional legal dogmatic 
method. Accordingly, I have examined the law, travaux préparatoires, 
relevant case law and academic opinion in order to answer the questions 
formulated in the previous chapter. Considering the fact that EU law differs 
flagrantly from national law, the method I have used deviates somewhat 
from traditional legal dogmatic methods used for the purpose of assessing 
national law. The sources of law within the EU legal order are in 
hierarchical order: the Treaties; the Charter; general principles; international 
agreements; secondary law; the case law by the CJEU and the CFI; travaux 
préparatoires; the Advocates’ General opinions; and legal doctrine. The 
binding sources of law are; primary law; the Charter, which pursuant to Art. 
6(1) TEU has transformed from soft law to one of the central parts of EU 
primary law and its constitutional framework; general principles, which 
reached constitutional recognition by virtue of Art. 6(3); international 
agreements; and binding secondary law (i.e. regulations, directives and 
decisions). The case law by the European courts is binding in principle; as 
general principles appear through recognition by the CJEU. The unwritten 
sources of law are characteristic for the EU legal order. The case law by the 
European courts and the general principles of EU law are more extensive 
and more significant than the case law and general principles within most 
national legal orders. The major difference is the relationship between the 
rules created by the judiciary and the legislator. Within many fields of EU 
law, the existing law is to be found in the case law of the European courts.
1
 
This reflects the incomplete character of EU law. As many areas of law are 
governed on the national level, the CJEU has been using general principles 
as a central source of law in order to determine the content of EU law. In 
this sense general principles constitute the “unwritten” European 
constitution.
2
 The importance of the case law of the Court in the EU legal 
setup cannot be overemphasised; its case law has inter alia had substantial 
effects for the relationship between EU law and national law. It was the 
CJEU that established and developed the concepts of direct effect and 
supremacy of EU, which constitute key features of the EU legal order.
3
 
Non-binding secondary law, travaux préparatoires; the Advocates’ General 
opinions and legal doctrine are not binding. Nevertheless, they are important 
sources of guidance.
4
   
The central sources of EU law for the purpose of this thesis are the 
Charter, its related the explanatory remarks, the ECHR and its protocols. Of 
                                                 
1
 Hettne and Otken Eriksson, 2011, p. 40 f. 
2
 Hettne and Otken Eriksson, 2011, p. 163.  
3
 Hettne and Otken Eriksson, 2011, p. 171 ff.  
4
 Hettne and Otken Eriksson, 2011, p. 40 f.  
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great relevance are naturally the Treaties; the TEU, the TFEU and 
specifically Protocol No. 8 relating to Art. 6(2). It should be emphasised that 
in the hierarchy of EU law, international agreements rank higher than 
secondary law but are subordinate to the Treaties, which has effects for the 
relevance of Protocol No. 8 relating to Art. 6(2) in the negotiation process 
on the EU’s accession to the ECHR5. In addition, I am referring to a number 
of other Charters and Conventions from which the drafters drew inspiration 
when stipulating the Charter’s provisions. I have also examined Draft legal 
instruments on the accession of the ECHR, press releases and important 
updates in the negotiation process, which are to be found at the Official 
website of the Council of Europe. Due to the CJEU’s crucial role for the EU 
legal order, I have studied a large amount of relevant cases of the CJEU and 
to some extent, particularly when analysing how the general provisions in 
Art. 51-53 CFREU should be interpreted, the related opinions by the 
Advocates General, which are delivered prior to the judgements of the Court 
to serve as guidelines for the Court. Additionally, I have studied relevant 
opinions by the CJEU under Art. 228 TEC and 218(11) TFEU and case law 
by the ECtHR. Being a highly current issue, when describing the academic 
debate, I am referring almost exclusively to journal articles, annual reports 
and working reports.  
1.4 Delimitations 
The focus of this thesis is to discuss and analyse Art. 6(1) and 6(2). The 
Lisbon Treaty may have had other effects in the field of fundamental rights, 
but the Charter acquiring legal status and the obligation for the EU to accede 
to the ECHR are in my view the two most important. When discussing the 
Charter as a legally binding document, and its effects for the level of 
protection of fundamental rights and the autonomy of the EU legal order I 
have paid much attention the the general provisions governing the 
interpretation and application of the Charter, as Art. 51 and Art. 53 are of 
great importance for the internal dimension of the autonomy of EU law, and 
as Art 52(3) is crucial for the external dimension. By contrast, I only briefly 
present the rights enshrined in Charter and how they relate to the 
corresponding provisions in the ECHR. Thus, this thesis provide no in depth 
analysis of the Charter’s content.  
When discussing the effects of EU’s accession to the ECHR, I focus 
on three solutions provided for by the Draft agreement. In my opinion, the 
prior involvement mechanism, the co-respondent and Inter-Party 
complaints are the most problematic features of the Draft agreement in 
relation to the autonomy of the EU legal order and the key functions of the 
CJEU. Hence, this is by no means an exhaustive review of the Draft 
agreements content.   
 
                                                 
5
 Baratta, 2013, p. 1322 f.  
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1.5 Disposition  
This thesis deals with some of the most substantial changes brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty for the autonomy of the EU legal order in the field of 
fundamental rights; Art. 6(1) and Art. 6(2) TEU. In section two, I will attend 
to the difference between the autonomy of EU law in general and the 
autonomy of EU law in the field of fundamental rights. I will also attend to 
how the CJEU elaborated a fundamental rights standard based on general 
principles prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Subsequently, 
the thesis is divided into two main sections (section 3 and 4). Section 3 deals 
with the Charter’s legal status. In this section, I will initially describe why 
the Charter was drawn up and how it has transformed from soft law a 
legally binding document. I will proceed to describe; its contents; where the 
rights contained in the Charter derive from and (insofar as they correspond 
to the ECHR); how they differ where the corresponding provisions are not 
identical. Thereafter, I will describe the general provisions governing the 
interpretation and application of the Charter (Art. 51-53) and present 
different opinions on how they should be interpreted. At last, I will describe 
how these provisions have been interpreted by the CJEU and the Advocates 
General in Åkerberg Fransson, Toshiba Corporation and Melloni. Section 4 
deals with the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Initially, I will describe why 
accession of the EU to the ECHR is still relevant since, pursuant to Art. 6(1) 
TEU, the EU has a fundamental rights catalogue of its own. I will continue 
by discussing the main obstacles to accession and explain how they were 
removed. Thereafter, I will present the requirements under Protocol No. 8 
relating to Art. 6(2) TEU. Subsequently, I will discuss the external 
dimension of autonomy which has been asserted by the CJEU in various 
opinions and cases. I will proceed to describe the process of the negotiations 
on accession, from initiated to finalized. Consequently, I will describe the 
most important mechanisms in the Draft agreement, depending on their 
relevance for the autonomy of the EU legal order. Lastly, I will discuss 
whether the Bosphorus-presumption, as elaborated by the ECtHR, is likely 
to continue after accession. In section 5 follows analyse of the questions 
formulated in Chapter 1.2. In Part I., I will analyse and discuss the level of 
protection of fundamental rights prior to and after the Lisbon Treaty’s entry 
into force.  Similarly, I will discuss and analyse the internal and external 
dimensions of the autonomy of the EU legal order prior to and after the 
Charter became legally binding. In Part II., I will begin by discussing what 
effects the EU’s accession to the ECHR will for the level of protection of 
fundamental rights within Europe. Subsequently, I will discuss the three 
most important solutions provided for by the Draft agreement in the light of 
the requirements set out in Protocol 8 TEU. When discussing these three 
procedural aspects, I will focus on whether they succeed in preserving the 
specific characteristics of the EU; notably the autonomy of EU law and the 
key functions of the CJEU. At last, I will briefly discuss whether the 
Bosphorus-presumption, elaborated by the ECtHR in its case law, is likely 
to continue once the accession of the EU to the ECHR has taken place. In 
section 6 follows conclusions on what effects Art. 6(1) and Art. 6(2) TEU 
have brought about. 
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2 The autonomy of the EU legal 
order in the field of 
fundamental rights 
2.1 The EU legal order in general  
It is difficult to assign EU legal order its rightful place in the legal order as a 
whole. EU law is neither a collection of international agreements nor an 
addendum to the domestic legal systems of the Member States. It is a unique 
legal system to which the Member States have limited their legislative 
sovereignty and as a result created a self-sufficient legal body that is binding 
on them and their citizens. By review of the groundbreaking case Costa 
ENEL
6
 of 1964, two important observations by the CJEU can be discerned. 
Firstly, the Member States have definitely transferred sovereign rights when 
establishing the Community. Secondly, the Member States may not question 
the status of EU law as a system that applies uniformly and generally 
throughout the Union. On the basis of these two observations, the CJEU 
established the principle of primacy of EU law, according to which which 
EU law shall prevail over conflicting provisions of the national legal orders. 
The principle of supremacy is crucial for the autonomy of the EU legal 
order as it is the only guarantee that EU law will not dissolve through 
interaction with the Member States domestic laws. Moreover, it secures the 
uniform application of EU law as it prevents the Member States from 
individually deciding on the substance of EU principles.  
 Despite the fact that EU is self-sufficient in relation to its Member 
States, the two systems are interlocked. They are applicable to the same 
people, who are citizens of a national state while simultaneously being EU 
citizens simultaneously. The double citizenship contradicts such a rigid 
dividing line of the respective legal orders. Moreover, the EU is dependent 
on the Member States. As the EU can not fully achieve its objects without 
the enforcement of EU law on the national level, Member States must not 
only respect EU law, but apply and implement it into their own legal orders. 
For this reason, the principle of sincere cooperation stipulates:   
 
‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall,  
in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.  
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure ful- 
filment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the insti- 
tutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s 
tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives.’7 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Case 6/64 Costa v. E.N.E.L 
7
 Art. 4(3) TEU  
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The relationship between EU law and national law results in occasional 
conflicts between the different legal orders. For this purpose, the CJEU 
established the concept of direct applicability of EU law. This principle 
guarantees the existence of the EU legal order. The first time the CJEU 
referred to this concept was in the case Van Gend & Loos, in which it held 
that  “[...] the Community constitutes a new legal order [...] the subjects of 
which comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them 
rights. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the 
Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a 
clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and 
upon the institutions of the Community.”8 The principles of direct effect and 
supremacy are the guardians of the autonomy of the EU legal order. Without 
these principles, the EU would not apply uniformly throughout the EU and 
would be watered down by contact with national law.
9
 
2.2 The EU legal order in the field of 
fundamental rights  
The principle of direct effect of EU law is particularly important in the field 
of fundamental rights as it improves the position of the individual by turning 
the fundamental rights protected by the EU into rights that can be enforced 
by individuals in national courts. By contrast, it is uncertain whether the 
principle of supremacy enhances the level of protection of fundamental 
rights within the EU. Since its establishment in Costa ENEL, the principle 
of supremacy had been frequently re-asserted by the CJEU. Whereas the 
Costa ENEL-judgment concerned the question of the primacy of EU law 
over national law in general, the Court has several times confirmed the 
principle of primacy also in relation to fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
national constitutions.
10
,
11
 Primacy of EU law with regard to fundamental 
rights as protected by the national constitutions has been hard to accept for 
some Member States. After initial hesitation, most national courts 
eventually accepted the interpretation by the CJEU. The constitutional 
courts of Germany and Italy were particularly resistant to accepting the 
primacy of EU law over national constitutional law, especially when it 
concerned the protection of fundamental rights. They did not withdraw their 
objections until the protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order 
had reached a standard that corresponded in essence to that of their national 
constitutions, although the Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court 
continues to make reservations towards the principle of supremacy.
12
 For 
                                                 
8 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos, para. 3 
9 Borchardt, 2010, p. 113 ff. 
10
 See particularly the judgments of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht of 29 May 1974, Solange I (2 BvL 
52/71) and of 22 Oct. 1986, Solange II (2 BvR 197/83); the judgment of the Italian Corte Costituzionale of 21 
April 1989 (No. 232, Fragd, in Foro it., 1990, I, 1855); the declaration of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional of 
13 Dec. 2004 (DTC 1/2004). 
11 Lenaerts, 2012, p. 397. 
12 Borchardt, 2010, p. 113 ff. 
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more than forty years, the CJEU and the constitutional courts of the Member 
States have been living in an illusion of unilateral supremacy. In the CJEU’s 
view, EU law has supremacy over national constitutions and in the national 
supreme courts’ view, the EU derives its legitimacy from the Member 
States’ constitutions, subjecting the EU to constitutional review. Their 
respective views have allowed the courts coexist in a harmonious 
relationship for almost half a century.
13
 
2.3 The CJEU’s development of 
fundamental rights through general 
principles  
The Treaty establishing the European Community in 1957 (TEC) contained 
only a few fundamental rights. As the CJEU was concerned with protecting 
the autonomy of the EU legal order in the field of fundamental rights, it 
refused to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed by national 
constitutions in its case law. Because of this refusal combined with the 
absence of a fundamental rights catalogue, there was a risk that the there 
would be no fundamental rights standard within the EU legal order 
whatsoever. In an attempt to fill this judicial gap, the CJEU started to 
develop general principles of EU law on the legal basis of Art. 220 TEC 
(which was replaced by Art. 19 TEU in the Lisbon Treaty), which stated 
that the European courts should “ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of this Treaty, the law is observed.”14 In addition, it created 
several fundamental rights on the basis of the general principle on 
equality.
15
 Similarly, from the four fundamental freedoms, through which 
the basic freedoms of professional life are guaranteed, the rights to freedom 
of movement and freedom to choose and practice a profession could be 
derived.  
A fundamental right becomes a general principle by recognition of the 
CJEU. When developing fundamental rights of the EU legal order through 
general principles, the CJEU drew inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and international agreements, 
notably the ECHR. On the basis of the ECHR, the CJEU recognised several 
fundamental freedoms and rights; e.g. the right of ownership, freedom of 
opinion, economic freedom, freedom of religion or faith, the right to due 
legal process, the ban on being punished twice for the same offence.
16
 
However, it was not until the late 1960’s that the CJEU started to build this 
framework for the protection of fundamental rights through its case law. 
Hitherto, the CJEU had rejected all actions relating to basic rights based on 
the argument that it was not for the Court to decide on matters that fell 
                                                 
13 Sarmiento, 2013. p. 1267 f. 
14 Lenaerts and de Smijter, 2001, p. 274 ff. 
15 e.g. the prohibition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 18 TFEU), preventing people being 
treated differently on the grounds of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, disability, age or sexual 
orientation (Article 10 TFEU), the equal treatment of goods and persons in relation to the four basic freedoms 
(freedom of movement of goods — Article 34 TFEU; freedom of movement of persons — Article 45 TFEU; the 
right of establishment — Article 49 TFEU; and freedom to provide services — Article 57 TFEU), freedom of 
competition (Article 101 et seq. TFEU) and equal pay for men and women (Article 157 TFEU). 
16 Borchardt, 2010, p. 25 f. 
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within the scope of national constitutional law. It had to alter its position 
after it had invented the concept of the supremacy of EU law in 1964, as it 
could only be properly established if EU law offered sufficient protection of 
the fundamental rights protected by the national constitutions. The starting 
point for the CJEU’s development of fundamental rights was the Stauder-
case from 1969 in which it referred to general principles and thereby 
recognised the existence of a EU framework of fundamental rights.
17
 The 
Court stated that  ”[...]the provision at issue contains nothing capable of 
prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general 
principles of Community law and protected by the Court.”18 A year later, in 
Internationale Handelsgesellshaft, it proclaimed that fundamental rights 
form an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court 
and referred to the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
19
 
In Nold of 1973, the CJEU mentioned the ECHR for the first time and 
declared itself “bound to draw inspiration from the Member States’ 
constitutions.”20 In Hauer of 1979, the Court made explicit reference to a 
provision of the ECHR.
21
 In Johnston of 1984, the CJEU stated that the 
requirement of judicial control is a general principle that underlies the 
constitutional traditions of the EU Member States and referred to Art. 6 and 
Art. 13 of the ECHR.
22
 In the late 1980’s, it became apparent that the 
CJEU’s would not only scrutinize acts by the EU institutions, but also acts 
by the Member States when implementing EU law.
23
 To conclude, from the 
early 1970’s and onwards, the CJEU increasingly emphasises fundamental 
rights, acknowledges the Member States’ constitutional fundamental rights 
and refers to the ECHR as a source of fundamental rights that should be 
followed.  
However, the fundamental rights standard that was achieved 
exclusively by the case law of the CJEU had a serious disadvantage; the 
Court was limited to the case in point. The CJEU could neither develop 
fundamental rights in all areas where it was necessary nor elaborate the 
necessary scope of and limits to the rights generally and distinctly enough. 
Moreover, the EU institutions could not assess whether there was a risk that 
they were infringing fundamental rights and the EU citizens could not know 
with certainty whether their rights had been violated.
24
 In addition to these 
disadvantages, the CJEU was frequently criticised for compromising the 
level of protection of fundamental rights for economic or political 
objectives.
25
 For example, in Nold the Court held that “Within the 
Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights should, 
if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives 
pursued by the Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is 
left untouched.” In this case, the applicant asserted that the contested 
decision violated his right to property and his right to the free pursuit of 
                                                 
17  Borchardt, 2010, p. 24 
18 Case 29/69, Stauder v. Ulm, para 7. 
19 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle Getreide, para 4.  
20 Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, paras 12-13.  
21 Case 44/79, Hauer, paras 17-19.  
22 Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, para 18. 
23 e.g. Case 5/88, Wachauf and Case 260/89 ERT.  
24 Borchardt, 2010, p. 27. 
25 Craig and de Burca, 2011, p. 399 f.  
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business activity, both of which were protected by the German constitution 
and international treaties, there among the ECHR. The CJEU reached the 
conclusion that the submission must be dismissed because the disadvantages 
claimed by the applicant were the result of economic changes brought about 
by the recession in coal production and not of the contested EU decision.
26
  
Despite the criticism, together with the disadvantages of developing a 
fundamental rights standard based solely on a court’s case law, and the 
obvious need for an EU catalogue of fundamental rights, it was not until the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty that constitutional recognition of the 
CJEU’s case law on general principles was achieved. Art. 6(3) TEU, 
declares that “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's 
law.” Moreover, due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU 
finally received a legally binding catalogue of its own: The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
27
   
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Case 4/73, Nold, paras 12-16. 
27 Lenaerts and de Smijter, 2001, p. 274 ff.  
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3 The Charter as a legally 
binding document  
 
3.1 The Charter - from soft law to a legally 
binding document  
The CJEU was not the only EU institution that was trying to enhance 
fundamental rights within the EU legal order. In 1989, the European 
Parliament adopted a declaration of fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
28
 However, there was no political motivation to go further and 
adopt a legally binding declaration.
29
 Moreover, there was great reluctance 
to amend the EC Treaty along the lines in order for the Union to adhere to 
ECHR. In the CJEU’s opinion 2/94 of 1996 (which will be elaborated in 
Chapter 4.4) the Court concluded that the EU had no competence to adhere 
to the ECHR.
30
 It was not until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty that 
the EU acquired competence to adhere to the ECHR. The precursor to the 
Charter was drawn up on the initiative of the EU Council for the purpose of 
demonstrating the EU’s achievements with regard to fundamental rights. 
The Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Commission proclaimed the ‘European Union’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights’ on 7 December 2000. However, this version of the Charter was not 
binding and while awaiting the outcome of a series of constitutional 
processes the Charter’s status remained undetermined. Due to the non-
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty the “ambiguous status” of the 
Charter was prolonged. It was renamed the “European Union’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and was once again proclaimed by the Presidents of 
the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on 12 
December 2007 in Strasbourg, this time as a separate instrument. By this 
point, it was frequently cited by the CFI, Advocates General and eventually 
even by the CJEU.
31
 Due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the 
Charter, in the 2007 version, finally acquired legal status through Art. 6(1) 
TEU, which states that the Charter “shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.” Thus, the Charter established the applicability of fundamental 
rights in EU law. The Charter applies to all but two Member States; Poland 
and the United Kingdom could not (or did not want to) adopt the system of 
fundamental rights of the Charter, as they were concerned with having to 
surrender or change certain national positions such as religious issues or the 
treatment of minorities. Hence, they are not bound by the fundamental rights 
of the Charter but, as previously, only by the case law of the CJEU.
32
  
                                                 
28 OJ, 1989, C 120/51. 
29 Lenaerts and de Smijter, 2001, p. 274 ff. 
30 Opinion 2/94, paras 35-36. 
31 Craig and de Burca, 2011, p. 394.  
32 Borchardt, 2010, p. 28. 
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When the Charter finally acquired legal value, there was reason to believe 
that the Charter would only be a “confirmation of past practice” since the 
EU already had a very dignified fundamental rights record. Besides the fact 
that the Charter encompasses many of the well-established fundamental 
rights that were developed through general principles by the CJEU, the 
Charter’s contents corresponds largely with the ECHR.33 Nevertheless, the 
Charter contributes with certain novelties while maintaining well-
established fundamental rights, all summarised in a straightforward manner. 
In its preamble, it asserts the need to “strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and 
scientific and technological development.” It also sets out one of the 
Charter’s main purposes; to make the rights guaranteed within the EU legal 
order more visible to the EU citizens.
34
 In hindsight, the Charter has 
arguably brought about significant changes in EU law. Far from “being a 
decorative declaration validating past practices,” it has forced the EU and 
the CJEU to take fundamental rights more seriously. It has indeed made 
fundamental rights more visible to its citizens and has brought to light issues 
that have been considered peacefully resolved. Henceforth, Member States 
may be exposed to specific obligations that will limit their margin of action 
when implementing EU law. Individuals are more familiar with the 
fundamental rights in the EU and the Member States’ responsibility to 
implement them. Thus, it is easier for them to seek judicial relief if their 
rights protected within the EU legal order have been violated. Lastly, the EU 
and its Member States are no longer “enforcers of a casuistic array of rights” 
which contents are spread over a number of judgments of the CJEU, but are 
the guardians of “a fully-fledged declaration of rights.”35  
3.2 The Charter and its contents 
The Charter is divided into seven titles. The six first titles contain the 
provisions on dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights and 
justice. The seventh title, which will be dealt with in the next three chapters, 
contains provisions governing the interpretation and application of the 
Charter.   
In the first title on dignity, the right to life
36
 and the prohibition of 
slavery and forced labour
37
 have been stripped to their core in the Charter. 
The latter deviates from the right enshrined in the ECHR in the sense that 
the prohibition of trafficking in human beings has been added to the CFREU 
provision. The wording of the provision prohibiting torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment
38
 is identical to its corresponding right in ECHR. The 
novelty in this title is the title is the right to the integrity of the person,
39
 
which contains e.g. the prohibition of harvesting of organs and the 
prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.  
                                                 
33
 Sarmiento, 2013, p. 1269 f. 
34 OJ 2012, C 326/391, para 4.  
35 Sarmiento, 2013, p. 1270.  
36 Art. 2 CFREU and Art. 2 ECHR 
37 Art. 5 CFREU and Art. 4 ECHR 
38 Art. 4 CFREU and Art. 3 ECHR 
39 Art. 3 CFREU 
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In the second title on freedoms, the right to liberty and security,
40
 
respect for private and family life,
41
 freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion,
42
 freedom of assembly and association,
43
 the right to education,
44
 
the right to property,
45
 and protection in the event of removal, expulsion or 
extradition
46
 are guaranteed by the Charter as well as the ECHR and its 
protocols. Novelties in this title are; the protection of personal data,
47
 a right 
contained in Art. 268 of the TEC as well as in EU secondary law; the 
freedom of the arts and science,
48
 which is a right deduced from the right to 
freedom of thought and expression and; the right to asylum,
49
 a right that 
derives from the Treaties (Art 78. TFEU) and the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees.
50
 The title also contains the freedom to choose an occupation and 
right to engage in work
51
 and the freedom to conduct a business,
52
 which 
were developed through general principles in the CJEU’s case law.53 
Moreover, certain rights in this title have been given a broader concept than 
its corresponding right in ECHR: instead of the right to marry, the CFREU 
protects the right to marry and the right to found a family
54
 and instead of 
protecting freedom of expression, the Charter guarantees freedom of 
expression and information.
55
  In this title, one discerns some differences 
between the two catalogues, and it becomes obvious how the Charter seeks 
to encapsulate the changes in the society.  
In the third title on equality, only one right corresponds to a right 
enshrined in ECHR, namely the article on non-discrimination.
56
 All other 
rights in this title (equality before the law, cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity, equality between women and men, the rights of the child, the 
rights of the elderly and integration of persons with disabilities)
57
 derive 
from other sources of law. These sources are the Treaties,
58
 general 
principles, the European Social Charter
59
 (ESC), the Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights for Workers
60
 and other conventions such as 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine with regard to genetic 
heritage
61
 and the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child.
62
 This 
title demonstrates that the Charter is not merely a copy of the ECHR, but 
draws upon various human rights instruments and reinforces several rights 
                                                 
40 Art. 6 CFREU and Art. 5 ECHR 
41 Art. 7 CFREU and Art. 8 ECHR 
42 Art. 10 CFREU and Art. 9 ECHR 
43 Art. 12 CFREU and Art. 11 ECHR 
44 Art. 14 CFREU and Art. 2 Protocol No. 1 (1952) ECHR  
45 Art. 17 CFREU and Art. 1 Protocol No. 1 (1952) ECHR 
46 Art. 19 CFREU and Art. 4 Protocol No. 7 (1984). See also ECtHR’s case law on Art. 3 ECHR, e.g. Ahmed v. 
Austria of 1986 and Soering v. the UK of 1989. 
47 Art. 8 CFREU 
48 Art. 13 CFREU 
49 Art. 18 CFREU 
50 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, and its Protocol 1967, UNHCR 
51 Art. 15 CFREU.  
52 Art. 16 CFREU  
53 See e.g. Case 4/73 Nold and Case 44/79 Hauer.  
54 Art. 9 CFREU and Art. 12 ECHR 
55 Art. 11 ECHR and Art. 10 ECHR 
56 Art. 21 CFREU and Art. 14 ECHR and its Protocol No. 12 (2000)   
57 CFREU Art. 20, 22-26 
58 Art. 6, 3 TEU and Art. 19, 167(1,4), 8, 157(3-4) TFEU 
59 Art. 23, 15 ESC 
60 p. 24, 25, 26 CCFSRW 
61 Art. 11 to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
62 See particularly Art. 3, 9, 12, 13 the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
 21 
guaranteed by the Treaties.  
Similarly, in the fourth title on solidarity, the rights largely correspond 
to rights in several other EU charters; the ESC;
63
 the revised Social 
Charter;
64
 and the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights for 
Workers.
65
 The rights included in this title are largely related to 
employment; workers right to information and consultation within the 
undertaking; right of collective bargaining and action; right of access to 
placement service; protection in the event on unjustified dismissal; fair and 
just working conditions and prohibition of child labour and protection of 
young people at work. Moreover, the title contains; the right to family and 
professional life; social security and social assistance; health care; access to 
services of general economic interest; environmental protection and 
consumer protection.
66
 For the majority of the rights in this title, inspiration 
was drawn from the EU charters mentioned above. The exceptions are 
environmental protection and consumer protection, which derive directly 
from the Treaties.
67
 
Likewise, in the fifth title on citizens’ rights, the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament and the right to 
vote, and stand as candidate at municipal elections partially corresponds 
with the right to free elections enshrined in ECHR
68
 and are partially 
enshrined in the Treaties.
69
 The right to good administration has partly been 
developed as a general principle of law by the CJEU, draws partly on the 
Treaties
70
 and corresponds to some extent with the right to an effective 
remedy in the sixth title. The right of access to documents, the article 
governing the European Ombudsman, right to petition, freedom of 
movement and of residence, and diplomatic consular protection all have 
their origin in the Treaties.
71
  
In the sixth title on justice, the right to an effective remedy and to a 
fair trial, presumption of innocence and right to defence, principle of 
legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties in the charter 
all have corresponding rights in ECHR.
72
 The principle of ne bis in idem is 
enshrined in the Charter as well as in one of the protocols to the Convention 
but, as will be described later, perhaps with different scopes and meanings.
73
   
To summarize, the ECHR and the Charter contains many of the same 
rights, albeit not necessarily with identical wording. By review of the 
Charter’s content, it is also clear that the Charter contains many novelties 
that reflect the changes in society, social progress and scientific and 
technological development. Many of the rights in CFREU have been given 
the same meaning as the corresponding right guaranteed by the ECHR. 
However, some of the rights in the CFREU have been given a wider scope – 
and certain rights a more limited scope – than in the ECHR.  
                                                 
63 Art. 21, 6, 1(3), 3, 2, 7, 16, 8, 12, 13, 11, ESC  
64 Art. 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, the Revised Social Charter  
65 p. 19, 8, 10,  CCRW 
66 Art. 27-38 CFREU 
67 Art. 3(3) TEU and Art. 11, 191 TFEU 
68 Art. 39-40 CFREU and Art. 3 Protocol No. 1 (1952) ECHR 
69 Art. 20(2) TFEU and Art. 14(3) TEU 
70 Art. 340, 20(2d), 25 TFEU 
71 Art. 15(3), 20, 228, 227, 20(2a), 77-79, 20 TFEU 
72 Art. 47-49 CFREU c. Art. 6, 13, 7 ECHR 
73 Art. 50 CFREU c. Art 4. Protocol No. 7 (1984) ECHR 
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3.2.1 Art. 51 – Field of application 
From Art. 51 CFREU follows:  
 
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore 
respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of 
the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties. 
 
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties. 
 
From the explanatory notes related to Art. 51 follows inter alia:  
 
[…] As regards the Member States, it follows unambiguously from the case-law of 
the Court of Justice that the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the 
context of the Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in the 
scope of Union law […] 
 
The provision on the Charter’s field of application is of importance for the 
divided competences between the EU and its Member States as well as the 
autonomy of their respective legal orders. Art. 51 governs when the Charter 
applies for the Member States; namely when they are implementing EU law.  
The most debated part of Art. 51 has certainly been how the expression 
“only when they are implementing Union law” should be interpreted, as it 
raises the issue of how the powers between the EU and its Member States 
should be distributed. Additionally, it raises the issue of the jurisdictions of 
the CJEU and the national supreme courts, which are the guardians of their 
respective legal orders, particularly the fundamental rights contained 
therein.
74
 A broad interpretation of the provision on the Charter’s field of 
application would be similar to the application of fundamental rights 
through general principles, prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty.
75
 According to certain scholars, a broad interpretation is preferable, 
as it would to enhance the unity and coherence of EU fundamental rights. 
According to Judge Marek Safjan, a broad interpretation is also more likely, 
mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the accession to ECHR will have the effect 
of turning the CJEU’s attention to areas of law that are connected with EU 
law but fall within the national competences. In Safjan’s words, “Even if it 
could be justified by a specific opportunism of the judges, driven by the 
intention of reducing the risk of a clash with the Court in Strasbourg, it 
would undoubtedly be a factor in favour of a broader application of the 
Charter.” Secondly, a broad interpretation would allow the CJEU to include 
the constitutional traditions of the Member States in its interpretation and 
application of the Charter. As put by Safjan, “Could the scope of the 
Charter's application be differentiated due to a different character of 
constitutional protective standards adopted in different Member States? The 
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positive answer to this question could hypothetically lead to a narrowing of 
the sphere of unified application of guarantees of fundamental rights 
included in the Charter.”76 
Similarly, Rosas and Kaila favour an application similar to general 
principles. According to them a “the reinforcement of the Charter’s status 
does not imply a rupture between the past and the present.”77 Consequently, 
the expression “when they are implementing EU law” calls for a quite broad 
interpretation, what matters is the existence of a connection with that law. 
The CJEU interpreted Art. 51 extensively in Åkerberg Fransson, where it 
considered itself to have jurisdiction, a position in contrast to the Advocate 
General’s opinion. A restrictive interpretation approach to Art. 51 would be 
to consider that the Charter is merely applicable in the situation of 
implementation of EU law in its strictest sense. Several Member States (e.g. 
Sweden, the Czech Repuplic, Ireland and the Netherlands) as well as the 
Commission and Advocate General Cruz-Villalón were of the opinion that 
Art. 51 should have been interpreted restrictively; the CJEU should not have 
had jurisdiction in Åkerberg Fransson, which will be elaborated in Chapter 
3.4.1.
78
  
3.2.2 Art. 52 – Scope and interpretation of 
rights and principles  
1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only 
if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised 
by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
2. Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall 
be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. 
3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the 
said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection.  
4. In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be 
interpreted in harmony with those traditions. 
5. […] 
6. […] 
7. The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of 
this Charter shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the 
Member States. 
8.  
Art. 52 can be described as a ”Pandora’s box” in the sense that paragraphs 
4-7, which were added in the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty in 
October 2004 for the purpose of clarifying the article, may have created a 
“new layer of doctrinal complexity.” Since the introduction of these 
paragraphs, the article can be seen as an internal as well as an external 
regulation clause.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 govern the internal regulation i.e. 
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how the rights within the Charter function. Paragraph 1 constitutes a general 
limitation (or derogation) clause and paragraph 2 aims to avoid the Charter 
replacing l’acquis communautaire. For this purpose, the second paragraph 
limits paragraph 1 in order to exclude the use of the limitation clause when 
derogations by way of the Treaty are applicable. Paragraphs 3 and 4 govern 
the external regulation i.e. how the Charter relates to other sources of 
fundamental rights in the EU. These paragraphs are of relevance for the 
autonomy of the EU legal order as they seek to govern how the rights 
enshrined in the Charter relate to fundamental rights protected by national 
constitutions and international agreements. The aim of Art. 52(4) is to 
ensure a harmonious relationship between the Charter and the Member 
States’ national constitutions. The aim of Art. 52(3) is to ensure a 
harmonious relationship between the Charter and the ECHR. Thus, Art. 52 
is both an internal and external regulation clause in the sense that it 
acknowledges the complicated application of fundamental rights in a 
pluralist context while simultaneously seeking to prevent the conflict of 
interpretation.
79
  
The drafters of the Lisbon Treaty clearly foresaw the problems that 
might arise where the two European fundamental catalogues overlap and 
therefore included Art. 52(3) to the CFREU as well as two comprehensive 
lists relating to that provision in the explanatory notes to the Charter.
80
 
Among the paragraphs of Art. 52, paragraph 3 is probably the most complex 
one. Its purpose is to ensure consistency between rights guaranteed by the 
Charter that correspond to rights enshrined in the ECHR, including 
authorised limitations.
81
 The explanatory remarks to Art. 52(3) present two 
lists. The first is a list of rights for which both the meanings and the scopes 
shall be the same as for the corresponding rights in ECHR. The second is a 
list of rights where the meanings shall be the same as for the corresponding 
ECHR rights, but where the scopes are wider. For example, the right to life 
and prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment will be given 
the same meaning and scope. By contrast, e.g. Art. 9 of the Charter covers 
the same field as Art. 12 ECHR (the right to marry) but may be extended to 
other forms of marriage, depending on the national legislation of the 
Member State. Similarly, the principle of ne bis in idem enshrined in Art. 50 
of the Charter corresponds to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 ECHR. However, 
it deviates from the ECHR right in the sense that “its scope is extended to 
European Union level between the Courts of the Member States.”82 
In Advocate General Kokott’s words, the first sentence of the article 
can be looked upon as a “homogeneity clause.”83 Presidents Skouris and 
Costa also favour an extensive interpretation of Art. 52(3). In their view, the 
Charter has become “the reference text and the starting point” for the 
CJEU’s assessment of the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU 
fundamental rights catalogue. It is therefore important to “ensure that there 
is the greatest coherence” between the Charter and the ECHR in so far as the 
rights of the two documents correspond. Given that the related explanatory 
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remarks to Art. 52(3) stipulates that (for certain rights) the meaning and 
scope of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the Charter shall the same, 
a “parallel interpretation” of the two fundamental rights catalogues would be 
preferable.
84
 However, the many attempts to include an unequivocal 
reference to ECHR have failed. According to the explanatory remarks 
relating to Art. 52(3), the ECtHR’s case law on the ECHR and its related 
protocols shall be taken into consideration.
85
 This requirement has 
deliberately been left out from the Charter. Moreover, Art. 52(7) of the 
Charter merely requires that the explanatory remarks shall be given due 
regard. Thus, the Charter does not require the CJEU to follow the 
explanations relating to the Charter in its interpretation.
86
  
3.2.3 Art. 53 – Level of protection 
“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by 
Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all 
the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions.” 
 
The purpose of Art. 53 is to maintain the level of protection currently 
provided for by EU law, national constitutions and international agreements, 
ultimately ensuring the constitutional autonomy of the Charter as well as a 
high standard of protection of human rights in the European legal orders.
87
 
However, it is uncertain how the expressions “nothing in this Charter” and 
“in their respective field of application” should be interpreted. Moreover, 
the references to the ECHR and national constitutions appear superfluous, as 
their respective relationships with the Charter are already addressed in Art. 
52(3) and 52(4). It seems as if Art. 53 is trying to reassure the Council of 
Europe and the EU Member States and that the Charter is not intended to 
replace the ECHR or the Member States national constitutions, although it is 
questionable whether it succeeds in doing so. Furthermore, it is debated 
whether the aim is to address the constitutional courts as well as the ECtHR, 
or whether it is specifically aimed at one of the two. In other words, does it 
particularly seek to preserve the internal or the external autonomy?  With 
regard to the internal autonomy, the article could, interpreted extensively, be 
looked upon as a “conflict of rules-clause” or a “best protection-clause,” i.e. 
giving national courts permission to deviate from the principle of supremacy 
if the level of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by their 
constitutions is higher. Conversely, interpreted restrictively, it could be 
interpreted as a reinforcement of the principle of supremacy. With regard to 
the external autonomy, Art. 53 could be interpreted as seeking to prevent the 
risk of two fundamental rights standards within Europe.  
The scholars have certainly tried to clarify the ambiguities of Art. 53. 
Should it be interpreted as a codification of the ‘Solange approach’ i.e. can 
the principle of supremacy of EU law be conditional? Does it allow the 
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national courts to deviate from the principle where EU law does not provide 
for a level of protection of fundamental rights equivalent to the protection 
provided for by the Member States constitutions? According to some 
scholars, as well as the CJEU, such an interpretation cannot be accepted.  
The aim of Art. 53 is not to limit the supremacy of EU law, but to reassure 
the Member States that the Charter is not intended to be a substitute for their 
constitutions. For this reason, the expression “in their respective fields of 
application” has been included to the provision. This expression can be 
interpreted as seeking to clarify that the Charter does not apply in situations 
that fall outside the scope of implementation of EU law; such situations are 
still exclusively governed by the Member States national constitutions. 
However, such an interpretation of Art. 53. deprives it of its effet utile, since 
it repeats what is already provided for by Art. 51. Similarly, the references 
to the ECHR and the national constitutions in Art. 53 are repetitions of 
issues that are already addressed in Art. 52(3) and 52(4). The expression 
“nothing in this Charter” have a more limited scope than “no provision of 
EU law.” Consequently, although the provisions of the Charter may not 
contradict the national constitutions, the TEU and TFEU may well do so.  
In Lenaert’s view, the most apt interpretation of Art. 53 would be that 
it is a rule seeking to reinforce the principle of supremacy of EU law in the 
sense that it demands the CJEU to explain its reasons for following - or 
departing from - the level of fundamental rights protection guaranteed by 
the Member States’ constitutions, and not a rule of conflict. Art. 53 
expresses the “constitutional pluralism” and mandates the CJEU to engage 
in dialogue with the national constitutional courts. To conclude, Art. 53 
must not be interpreted in line with the ‘Solange’ approach. Instead, it must 
be interpreted in light of the cases Omega
88
 and Sayn-Wittgenstein.
89
 In 
Omega, the CJEU held that“it is not indispensable for the restrictive 
measure issued by the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a 
conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which 
the fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to be protected and 
that, on the contrary, the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions 
adopted are not excluded merely because one Member State has chosen a 
system of protection different from that adopted by another State.”90 Thus, 
Art. 53 could never deprive EU law of its supremacy over national law, 
even where a national constitution offers a higher level of protection than 
that guaranteed under EU law. However, the CJEU is unlikely to give 
supremacy to an EU measure which “does not pay due homage” to the 
Member States’ constitutional traditions. Provided that the essential interests 
of the EU are not adversely affected by national measures implementing EU 
law, the CJEU leaves to the Member States the question of determining the 
level of protection of fundamental rights in accordance with their 
constitutions.
91
 
As far as the external dimension of the autonomy of EU law is 
concerned, it has been argued that Art. 53 could have increased the risk of 
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two potential European fundamental rights standards. Consequently, where 
the wordings of the texts in CFREU and ECHR do not correspond exactly, 
the CJEU and the ECtHR could interpret corresponding rights differently. 
The risk of one “CFREU standard” and one “ECHR standard” for 
corresponding rights has been rejected by some scholars in the academic 
debate. According to Lenaerts and de Smijter, the Charter was never drawn 
up for the purpose of replacing the ECHR and where the texts of the two 
documents depart, it can never be at the expense of the level of protection 
guaranteed by the ECHR.
92
 In fact, because of the ECtHR jurisdiction’s 
subsidiary character, the risk of two fundamental rights standards for 
corresponding rights is rather weak. According to Advocate General Jacobs,  
“[t]he danger of an overlap between the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
and the European Court of Human Rights would not in fact be great. The 
latter has always stressed that its jurisdiction is subsidiary, in the sense that 
it is primarily for the national authorities and the national courts to apply the 
Convention [...] Thus, if the Court of Justice were to extend the 
circumstances in which the Convention may be invoked under Community 
law, the result would simply be to increase the likelihood of a remedy being 
found under domestic law, without the need for an application to the organs 
established by the Convention.”93 Moreover, the threat of diverging 
interpretations would vanish completely following accession to ECHR, as 
the ECHR will transform into a formal source of law in the EU legal order, 
which will be elaborated in section 4. 
3.3 The emergence of the Charter in the 
CJEU’s case law 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the number of references to 
the Charter by the CJEU has increased rapidly. The number of decisions in 
which the Court referred to the Charter in its reasoning almost doubled in a 
year, from 43 in 2011 to 87 in 2012. Similarly, the number of preliminary 
rulings in which the national courts referred to the Charter had increased by 
65 % in a year, from 27 in 2011 to 41 in 2012.
94
  The DEB- case of the 22 
December 2010 serves an illustrative example. In this case, the Court stated: 
“As regards fundamental rights, it is important, since the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, to take account of the Charter, which has ‘the same legal 
value as the Treaties’, pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) 
TEU.” The case concerned the right to a fair trial. The CJEU recognized that 
Art. 52(7) and the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU requires that the 
explanatory notes to the Charter must be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the Charter. The relevant provision of the Charter was Art. 
47(2), which corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The Court declared 
that when a case concerns a right in the Charter that corresponds to rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR, according to Art. 52(3) the right shall be given the 
same meaning and scope as the latter. Moreover, the explanatory notes to 
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Art. 52(3) requires that the meaning and scope shall be determined not only 
by reference to the text of the ECHR, but also by reference to the case law 
of the ECtHR.
95
 In the CJEU’s own case law,96 the CJEU had previously 
ruled that particularly for Art 47(3) the provision should include legal aid 
where the absence of such aid would make it impossible to ensure an 
effective remedy. In DEB, the Court held that Art. 47(3) “must be 
interpreted in its context, in the light of other provisions of EU law, the law 
of the Member States and the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights.” When reviewing the ECtHR’s case law, the CJEU found that the 
ECtHR had stated several times that the right of access to a court is 
intrinsically linked to the right to a fair trial. For this purpose, it is crucial 
that a one is not denied one’s right to present one’s case effectively before a 
court. However, the right of access to a court is not absolute. The CJEU 
found it apparent, after review of the ECtHR’s case law, that the grant of 
legal aid to legal persons was not in principle impossible. Thus, The Court 
reached the conclusion that “the principle of effective judicial protection, as 
enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that it 
is not impossible for legal persons to rely on that principle...”97 However, 
the grant of legal aid would have to be assessed in the light of the applicable 
rules and the company’s situation. The DEB-case demonstrates the CJEU’s 
deferential treatment of the ECHR provisions and its sincere wish that its 
case law shall be in line with that of the ECtHR. It shows how the Court 
takes the duties set out in Art. 52(3) and Art. 52(7) sincerely and ensures 
consistency between rights guaranteed by the Charter and the ECHR.   
Similarly, the Court strived to ensure the Charter’s coherence with the 
ECHR in the joined cases N.S. and M.E. of the 21 December 2011.
98
 The 
central right in these cases was the prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment and the cases concerned the Common European 
Asylum System. The CJEU emphasised that “this system is based on the full 
and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention and the guarantee that 
nobody will be sent back to a place where they again risk being persecuted.” 
The Court proceeded to state that the Common European Asylum System 
was conceived in a context where it would be possible to assume that the 
participating states observed fundamental rights as guaranteed e.g. by the 
Geneva Convention and the ECHR. In fact, it was because of that principle 
of mutual confidence that the contested regulation was adopted, with the 
aim to “increase the legal certainty with regard to the determination of the 
State responsible for examining the asylum claim and thus to avoid forum 
shopping…” Under such circumstances, it must have been possible to 
assume that all the Member States’ asylum systems complied with the 
Charter, the Geneva Convention and the ECHR. The CJEU referred to the 
ECtHR-case M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece
99
 and reached the conclusion 
that Art. 4 of the Charter “must be interpreted as meaning that the Member 
States…may not transfer an asylum seeker to the ‘Member State 
responsible’…where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in 
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the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in 
that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the 
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision.”100  
To conclude, also in this case, the respectful treatment of the 
corresponding ECHR provisions and the ECtHR as a specialised court in the 
field of human rights is apparent. However, the CJEU’s treatment of ECHR 
illustrated by DEB and N.S. and M.E is only one of the lines of case law that 
can be discerned by review of the CJEU’s case law.  
3.4 The general provisions on application 
and interpretation of the Charter in the 
light of Melloni, Toshiba Corporation 
and Åkerberg Fransson 
3.4.1 Art. 51 as interpreted by the CJEU in 
Åkerberg Fransson  
Since the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, a couple of cases brought before 
the CJEU have dealt with Art. 51, but none of them clarified its scope of 
application.
101
 The CJEU’s ruling in Åkerberg Fransson102 of the 26 
February 2013 has casted some light over the provision. The case concerned 
a dispute between the Swedish public prosecutor’s office and the defendant 
Mr Fransson concerning proceedings for serious tax offences. For these 
offences, criminal penalties (Skattebrottslagen) as well as administrative 
penalties (Taxeringslagen) exist under Swedish law.
103
  
The admissibility of the questions referred to the CJEU was disputed 
among the Member States and the Commission, some of which were of the 
opinion that the CJEU should only have jurisdiction if the administrative 
penaltiy that was the subject matter of the main proceedings arose from 
implementation of EU law. With regard to the admissibility of the case, the 
CJEU initially stated:  
 
“The Court’s settled case-law indeed states, in essence, that the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations 
governed by European Union law, but not outside such situations. In this respect the Court 
has already observed that it has no power to examine the compatibility with the Charter of 
national legislation lying outside the scope of European Union law. On the other hand, if 
such legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, the Court, when requested to 
give a preliminary ruling, must provide all the guidance as to interpretation needed in order 
for the national court to determine whether that legislation is compatible with the 
fundamental rights the observance of which the Court ensures.”  
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The explanatory notes with regard to Art. 51 state the provision is only 
binding upon the Member States “when they act in the scope of Union law.” 
In the case at hand, the tax penalties and criminal proceedings imposed on 
Mr. Åkerberg Fransson were partly connected to breaches of his obligations 
to declare value added tax (VAT). From several directives as well as the 
Art. 4(3) TEU follow that each Member State is obliged to take ”all 
legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection 
of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion.” Moreover, 
Art. 325 TFEU obliges the EU Member States “to counter illegal activities 
affecting the financial interests of the European Union through effective 
deterrent measures and, in particular, obliges them to take the same 
measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the European 
Union as they take to counter fraud affecting their own interests.” The Court 
proceed to state that “Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Charter must therefore be complied with where national legislation falls 
within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are 
covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental 
rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails 
applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.”104 For 
the purposes of Art. 51(1), where a national court is to review if a national 
provision complies with fundamental right in an area of law that is not 
entirely determined by EU law, “national authorities and courts remain free 
to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided 
that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the 
Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are 
not thereby compromised.”105 Consequently, because the information 
provided for by the defendant had provided was false, the tax penalties and 
criminal proceedings for tax evasion constituted implementation of several  
EU directives and Art. 325 TFEU. Subsequently, the CJEU had jurisdiction 
on the Åkerberg Fransson- case. In other words, Sweden had implemented 
EU law and the case was within the scope of Art. 51(1) of the Charter.
106
 
Advocate General Cruz-Villalón was of the opinion that the CJEU 
lacked jurisdiction in the Åkerberg Fransson-case. According to him, the 
competence of the EU to assume responsibility for guaranteeing the 
fundamental rights, in relation to the exercise of a national public authority 
implementing EU law, must be explained by a specific interest of the EU in 
ensuring that that he exercise of the national public authority is in 
accordance with fundamental rights as guaranteed by EU law. “The mere 
fact that such an exercise of public authority has its ultimate origin in Union 
law is not of itself sufficient for a finding that there is a situation involving 
the ‘implementation’ of Union law.”107 Consequently, “the question is 
whether a State legislative activity based directly on Union law is equivalent 
to the situation in this case, where national law is used to secure objectives 
laid down in Union law. In other words, the question is whether the two 
situations are equivalent from the perspective of the qualified interest of the 
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EU in assuming direct, centralised responsibility for guaranteeing the right 
concerned.”  It seems risky to assert that, by means of a provision of a EU 
directive, the legislature was anticipating the transfer of all the constitutional 
guarantees governing the exercise of the Member States’ power to impose 
penalties, including the collection of VAT, from the Member States to the 
EU. Therefore, this case must not be regarded as a situation involving the 
implementation of Union law within the meaning of Art. 51(1).  
Accordingly, the CJEU should have declared that it lacked jurisdiction in 
the proceedings at hand.
108
 
It appears that the Åkerberg Fransson-case confirms the CJEU’s 
previous case law on Art. 51(1) such as Wachauf
109
and ERT,
110
 according to 
which actions of the Member States must be in accordance with the 
requirements deriving from the fundamental rights guaranteed in the EU 
legal order which are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but 
not outside such situations. The CJEU’s position is that “Since the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied 
with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union 
law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European 
Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable. The 
applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Charter.”111 According to the logic of the CJEU’s 
reasoning, CJEU assimilates the meaning of “implementing EU law with 
“the scope of EU law.”  It confirms that the Charter and general principles 
overlap in the sense that they have a similar scope of application in EU law. 
To conclude, the Charter does not alter the scope of application of 
fundamental rights protection, but respects the constitutional allocation of 
powers provided for by the Treaties.
112
 
3.4.2 Art. 52(3) as interpreted by the CJEU 
in Åkerberg Fransson, Toshiba 
Corporation and Melloni 
In contrast to the line of case law in e.g. DEB and NS and M.E., the CJEU 
seemed much less concerned to ensure the Charter’s consistency with 
ECHR in the case Melloni
113
 of 26 January 2013, concerning a European 
warrant’s compatibility with the right to a fair trial. Initially, the CJEU 
proclaimed the Charter’s legal status, as set out in Art. 6(1) TEU. The Court 
proceeded to remind the reader that the right to a fair trial in Art. 47 and 
48(2) is not absolute and referred to its own case law. The Court mentioned 
quite briefly that the interpretation of Art. 47 and 48(2) of the Charter was in 
keeping with the scope of Art. 6(1) and (3) of the ECHR as interpreted by 
the ECtHR in its case law,
114
 but did not refer to Art. 52(3). In Toshiba 
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Corporation and Åkerberg Fransson, it was even more apparent how the 
CJEU was avoiding the requirement of harmonious interpretation as neither 
of these cases contained any reference to Art. 52(3), the corresponding 
ECHR provision in Art. 4 to Protocol 7 ECHR or the ECtHR’s case law on 
this provision. Both these cases concerned the principle ne bis in idem the 
“right not to be tried or punished twice” or, as put in the Art. 50. CFREU, 
the “right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the 
same criminal offence.”  
The principle of ne bis in idem is guaranteed within many legal orders 
and international agreements. For instance, it is enshrined in ECHR. 
However, given that the ECtHR is of subsidiary character, this provision is 
limited to the jurisdiction of each Contracting Party to the ECHR. By 
contrast, the principle guaranteed within the scope of EU law can apply in 
domestic, transnational and/or on EU level. Hence, despite the vast array of 
principles of ne bis in idem, there is no similar principle with a similar 
function to Art. 50 CFREU.
115
 Therefore, the explanatory remarks stipulate 
that, in relation to Art. 4 Protocol 7 ECHR, the scope of Art. 50 CFERU “is 
extended to European Union level between the Courts of the Member 
States.”116 The ECtHR has elaborated the meaning of Art. 4 to Protocol 7 
in its landmark case Zolotukhin
117
, Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7 “prohibits 
prosecution or trial for the same offence in so far as it arises from identical 
facts or facts that are substantially the same.”118 Thus, when deciding the 
nature of the offence, the ECtHR only takes account of whether the facts are 
identical or not, and not of the legal classification if the offence. Moreover, 
the ECtHR has stipulated three criteria (the Engel-criteria
119
) in order to 
determine whether the first penalty is of criminal nature and, in combination 
with prosecution under criminal law, constitutes infringement of Art. 4 
Protocol 7 ECHR. These criteria are based on its legal classification of the 
offence under domestic law, the nature of of the offence and the degree of 
severity of the penalty that the defendant is liable to incur. It is clear by 
review of the ECtHR’s case law, e.g. Janosevic120 and Västberga Taxi 
Aktiebolag,
121
that the administrative fiscal penalties provided for by 
Swedish law of criminal nature under Art. 6 ECHR. Thus, the combination 
of administrative penalties (provided for by Taxeringslagen) and criminal 
proceedings, which were also at hand in Åkerberg Fransson, is not accepted 
according to the ne bis in idem principle as it is enshrined in the ECHR.
122
  
Before the Charter became legally binding, the CJEU protected the 
principle of ne bis in idem as a general principle of community law. 
However, the CJEU adopted its own interpretation of the principle, which 
did not exclude double prosecution or the imposition of punitive damages. 
In its case law, the CJEU has adopted two lines of case law in relation to ne 
bis in idem. On the one hand, it has adopted the Engel-criteria, for example 
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in the case Bonda.
123
 On the other hand, in the field of competition law, the 
CJEU has not elaborated a principle that is fully in line with the ECtHR’s 
case law on Art. 4 Protocol 7 ECHR. For instance, in the joined cases 
Cement,
124
 it avoided the Engel-criteria and adopted instead a threefold 
condition in order to determine the character on the first penalty, based on: 
the identification of facts, unity of offender, and unity of the legal interest 
protected. This approach is not in line with the Zolotukhin-doctrine as 
elaborated by the ECtHR.
125
  
Toshiba Corporation
126
 of the 14 February 2012 concerned a decision 
by the commission to penalise the members of a cartel, which had already 
been subjected to sanctions by a national competition authority before that 
state acceded to the EU. Advocate General Kokott was of the opinion that 
the requirement of homogeneity in Art. 52(3) CFREU was applicable. 
According to her, Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7 as interpreted by the ECtHR 
constitutes a minimum standard that must be guaranteed in the interpretation 
and application of the principle of ne bis in idem in EU law. Consequently, 
she examined the ECtHR’s case law. According to the Zolotukhin-
doctrine,
127
 Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7 “prohibits prosecution or trial for the 
same offence in so far as it arises from identical facts or facts that are 
substantially the same.” When deciding the nature of the offence, the 
ECtHR only takes account of whether the facts are identical or not, and not 
of the legal classification if the offence. As there was nothing that suggested 
that the scope of the protection provided by the principle should be less 
extensive in relation to competition law, account should only be taken to the 
identity of the facts.
128
 The CJEU adopted a different approach than the one 
suggested by the Advocate General. Rather than referring to the Zolotukhin- 
doctrine and give Art. 50 the same meaning and scope as the corresponding 
ECHR right, the Court referred exclusively to its own case law. There was 
no mentioning of neither the ECHR nor the ECtHR’s case law.129 The CJEU 
reached the conclusion that the principle of ne bis in idem does not prohibit 
that fines are imposed by the Commission on cartel members, because 
sanctions had already been imposed by a national competition authority on 
the same members for undertakings in the same cartel that had 
anticompetitive effects in that Member State before its accession to the EU, 
as long as the second punishment was “not designed to penalise the said 
effects.
130
   
 
To interpret Art 50 CFREU in line with Art. 4 to Protocol 7 ECHR would 
indeed problematic particularly in relation to competition law. By contrast 
to Art. 4 to Protocol 7, the reach of Art. 50 CFREU is not limited to the 
jurisdiction of every single Member State but has transnational effect in the 
integrated legal order of the EU. For the EU Member States, the 
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consequences are considerable when they implement and enforce EU law, 
as they no longer can limit the principle of ne bis in idem to criminal law 
sensu strictu but have to face the transnational application of ne bis in idem 
for all punitive sanctions. Thus they have to provide for a wider scope of 
protection so as to include punitive administrative sanctions. This will have 
the effect of an increasing need to determine the case allocation in the EU 
with regard to investigations and punishment under administrative and 
criminal law. As put by Vervaele, “the ne bis in idem principle cannot 
function properly in a common area without the coordination of jurisdiction 
and binding criteria on choice of jurisdiction and a proper allocation of cases 
in the common justice area.”131  
If the absence of reference to ECHR could have been interpreted as an 
accident de parcours in Toshiba Corporation, the Åkerberg Fransson case 
proved that the absence of reference to ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law 
was a deliberate choice. Once again, the CJEU referred only to its own case 
law. However, it implicitly applied the ECtHR’s case law when using the 
Engel-criteria. In order to determine the criminal nature of the 
administrative penalties within the frame of the CFREU right,
132
 the CJEU 
referred to Bonda (a CJEU-case that in turn refers to these criteria).
133
 It is 
not surprising that the CJEU adopted this approach rather than a full 
application of the Engel-criteria, as a full adoption thereof would threaten 
the effectiveness of EU competition law.
134
 Moreover, the CJEU did not 
refer to cases from the ECtHR in which that Court had already, through 
application of these criteria, recognized the criminal nature of the tax 
increase stipulated by the contested administrative penalty 
(taxeringslagen).
135
 The definite distance taken with the ECHR was that the 
CJEU stated that if the national court decides to apply national standards 
because the ECHR requires that the Member State must give up the 
accumulation of tax and penalties, it can not do so without disregarding EU 
law, unless the remaining sanctions are effective, proportional and 
deterrent.
136
 By contrast to the corresponding ECHR provision, the 
interdiction of the double punishment is not an absolute right in EU law. Its 
application remains subordinate the imperative of effectiveness of EU law, 
and therefore it offers a lower level of protection than that guaranteed by the 
ECHR Thus, the CJEU was ignorant of Art. 53 of the ECHR, which serves 
as a safeguard for existing human rights.
137
  
 Advocate General Cruz-Villalón based his reasoning on why Art. 50 
CFREU is not guaranteed in the same way as the corresponding principle in 
ECHR on the non-consensus among the EU Member States with regard to 
Art. 4 Protocol 7. This ECHR provision is either not fully applicable or not 
applicable at all in several Member States. For instance, France and 
Luxembourg have made reservations with regard to Art. 4, the Netherlands 
and Germany have not ratified Protocol 7 and the UK has not even signed it. 
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Several Member States, such as Austria, Italy and the Netherlands have 
limited the scope of application of Art. 4 by precluding its application to 
punitive penalties outside the area of criminal law.
138
 By contrast, Sweden, 
which is the State that referred the Åkerberg Fransson-case to the CJEU, is 
one of the EU Member States that has ratified Protocol 7 to the ECHR.
139
 
Thus, there is an obvious lack of agreement between the EU Member 
States on the imposition of both criminal and administrative penalties in 
relation to the same offence. For a great deal of Member States, measures 
imposing administrative penalties and the possibility of initiating criminal 
prosecutions are equally crucial. As put by Advocate General Cruz-Villalón: 
“On the one hand, States do not wish to abandon the characteristic 
effectiveness of administrative penalties, particularly in sectors where the 
public authorities seek to ensure rigorous compliance with the law, such as 
fiscal law or public safety law. On the other hand, the exceptional nature of 
criminal prosecution and the guarantees which protect the accused during 
proceedings incline States to retain an element of decision-making power as 
regards actions which warrant a criminal penalty.” This twofold interest 
explains why several Member States hold on to this dual power to punish 
despite the fact that it is prohibited in the ECHR. Advocate General Cruz-
Villalón continued by stating “The fact that the referring court appears to 
assume that Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR and the Charter are on 
an equal footing raises serious difficulties.” According to him, the Åkerberg 
Fransson-case demonstrates how the lack of agreement concerning Art. 4 of 
Protocol 7 clashes with the widespread existence and well-established 
nature of domestic systems in the EU Member States in which both an 
administrative and a criminal penalty may be imposed in respect of the same 
offence. Such systems could even be described as a common constitutional 
tradition of the Member States. In his view, the CJEU should rightly not 
strictly follow the ECtHR’s case law in this case. The principle of ne bis in 
idem does not constitute a “core-principle” i.e. a right that, according to the 
explanatory notes, shall be given the same meaning as well as the same 
scope as the corresponding ECHR right. Therefore, the court must take “A 
partially autonomous interpretation of Article 50 of the Charter.”140 Such an 
interpretation of Art. 50 is incompatible with the ECtHR’s line of case law 
and resembles the CJEU’s application of ne bis in idem in relation to 
competition law.
141
 A partially autonomous interpretation of Art. 50 CFREU 
has the effect of nullifying the non-ratifications and reservations that several 
Member States have made with regard to Art. 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR. 
Arguably, in this sense, the CJEU’s interpretation is an extension of the 
competence of the EU and in breach of Art. 51(2) of the Charter.
142
 
 
 
The CJEU, did not discuss the issue of non-consensus in its reasoning. 
Initially, the Court stated that Art. 50 CFREU does not preclude a Member 
State from imposing a combination of tax and criminal penalties. Such a 
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combination is only precluded if the tax/administrative penalty is criminal in 
nature, i.e. based on its legal classification of the offence under domestic 
law, the nature of of the offence and the degree of severity of the penalty 
that the person concerned is liable to incur. These criteria are known as the 
Engel-criteria, elaborated by the ECtHR and adopted by the CJEU in the 
Bonda-case. The assessment of whether the first tax penalty is of criminal 
nature is for the national court to decide, by assessment of these criteria. The 
national court may conclude that the combination violates the principle of 
ne bis in idem, as long as the remaining penalties are effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive, which is a reference to the effet utile notion in relation to 
enforcement (see Inspire Art
143
 from 2003.)
144
 As the CJEU left for the 
national court to decide whether the combination at hand infringed the 
principle of ne bis in idem as enshrined Art. 50 CFREU, it is unclear if the 
combination of tax and criminal penalties under Swedish law is allowed 
under the Charter.
145
 According to Vervaele, it was tactful of the CJEU to 
avoid the non-consensus discussion, by not referring to the limited binding 
force of the corresponding ECHR provision in relation to some Member 
States, as the non-consensus debate does not concern the EU legal order as 
such. Moreover, to not apply the Charter because of the non-ratifications or 
reservations by EU Member States in relation to the ECHR would involve 
the risk that the Charter could become dependent on reservations under 
international law. Thus, Member States may apply their national standards 
in relation to double sanctions but the outcome must comply with the lower 
threshold provided by Art. 50 CFREU. Arguably, interpreted as an 
autonomous document, the Charter contribute to the level of protection of 
fundamental rights within Europe, in the sense that it is a leeway for the 
development of fundamental rights protection that goes beyond the 
minimum requirement under ECHR, a possibility foreseen by Art. 52(3) 
CFREU.  As Art. 50 CFREU applies, not only in domestic situations, but 
also in transnational situations and on EU level, it has a wider scope of 
application that all other provisions guaranteeing the right not to be 
punished twice. Moreover, according to Art. 52(3), the Charter can provide 
for a wider scope than inter alia Art. 4 Protocol 7 ECHR. Thus, when 
considering the risk of diverging interpretations, one must bear in mind that 
the CJEU can provide for a wider protection than the ECtHR, as the ECHR 
constitutes a minimum standard. An interpretation by the CJEU that 
diverges with that of the ECtHR could still be in perfect harmony with the 
CFREU as well as the ECHR as long as the minimum standards of both of 
the fundamental rights catalogues are respected.
146
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3.4.3 Art. 53 as interpreted by the CJEU in 
Melloni  
The Melloni-case primarily dealt with the question of the correct 
interpretation of Art. 53 CFREU. In essence, the referring Court asked 
whether Art. 53 CFREU allows the Member State to make conditional the 
surrender of a person convicted in his or her absence, when the conviction is 
subject to review in the referring Member State, in order to avoid that the 
right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the referring Member State’s 
constitution is adversely affected. One of the interpretations envisaged by 
the referring court is that Art. 53 CFREU is a general authorisation allowing 
Member States to apply the standard of protection of fundamental rights 
guaranteed by their constitutions if the standard is higher than that 
guaranteed by the Charter. In other words, it would allow the Member State 
to deviate from the principle of supremacy. In the case at hand, such an 
interpretation would allow the referring Court to make the execution of a 
European arrest warrant (issued for the purposes of executing a sentence 
rendered in absentia) conditional, in order to avoid adverse effects for 
fundamental rights recognised by its constitution, despite the fact that the 
application of such conditions is not allowed under the EU decision relating 
to the EU warrant. In paragraph 60, the CJEU stated: “It is true that Article 
53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal act calls for national 
implementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply 
national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the 
level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, 
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby 
compromised.” However, the interpretation of Art. 53 conceived by the 
referring court cannot be accepted as it would undermine the principle of 
supremacy of EU law. Were a Member State allowed to set aside a 
provision of EU law in order to protect a constitutional right, it would cast 
doubt on “the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights 
as defined in the framework decision. It would undermine the principles of 
mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to uphold and 
would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework decision.” In 
the light of the foregoing, Art. 53 must be understood as not allowing a 
Member State to make the surrender of a person convicted in his or her 
absence conditional.
147
 The reasoning of Advocate General Bot went along 
the same lines. In his view, Art. 53 is not an apt clause for regulating 
conflicts between provisions of EU law and the Member States 
constitutions. It has neither the objective nor the effect of giving priority to 
the rule providing the highest level of protection. If an EU provision had to 
give way for a provision deriving from a national constitution, it would 
undermine the principle of primacy settled by the CJEU in its case law. As 
far Advocate General Bot was concerned, one must not underestimate the 
political and symbolic value of Art. 53. When identifying the role of Art. 53 
within the Charter, one must also bear in mind that Art. 53 complements 
Art. 51 and 52 and must therefore be read together with these provisions. 
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According to the explanatory remarks to Art. 53, ”[t]his provision is 
intended to maintain the level of protection currently afforded within their 
respective scope by Union law, national law and international law. Owing to 
its importance, mention is made of the ECHR.”  The drafters of the Charter 
were clearly aware of the existence of other sources of protection for 
fundamental rights that were binding for the Member States. The seventh 
title’s main objective is to provide a way for the Charter to coexist with the 
plurality of sources of protection for fundamental rights. The provisions of 
the Charter must be interpreted in the light of other national and 
international legal sources. According to Art. 52(3) the ECHR constitutes a 
minimum standard and according to Art. 52(4) in so far as the Charter 
recognises fundamental rights as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, the Charter must be interpreted in 
harmony with those traditions. Art. 53 emphasises that the Charter is not 
intended to become the exclusive instrument for protecting fundamental 
rights. It cannot on its own have the effect of adversely affecting or reducing 
the level of protection resulting from other sources of fundamental rights 
protection in their respective fields of application. The expression “in their 
respective fields of application” seeks inter alia to reassure Member States 
of the fact that the Charter is not designed to replace the national 
constitutions. The Charter imposes a level of protection for fundamental 
rights only within the field of application of EU law. Thus, it cannot have 
the effect of requiring Member States to lower the level of protection of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by their national constitution in cases, which 
fall outside the scope of EU law. Conversely, adoption of the Charter should 
not serve as a pretext for a Member State to reduce the protection of 
fundamental rights in the field of application of national law.
148
  
The CJEU never explicitly referred to Art. 53 in Åkerberg Fransson. 
However, it referred to the above stated paragraph 60 of the Melloni case. 
Hence, the Court implicitly dealt with the question of the CFREU’s level of 
protection. In Åkerberg, the CJEU stated, that“[n]ational authorities and 
courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental 
rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as 
interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
European Union law are not thereby compromised see, paragraph 60 in the 
Melloni-case.”149 The CJEU proceeded to state that “It is for the referring 
court to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether the combining of 
tax penalties and criminal penalties that is provided for by national law 
should be examined in relation to the national standards as referred to in 
paragraph 29 of the present judgment, which could lead it, as the case may 
be, to regard their combination as contrary to those standards, as long as the 
remaining penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”150 
According to Sarmiento, the CJEU has in Åkerberg and Melloni, “created a 
framework of ‘situations’ with the purpose of allocating the respective 
scopes of application and protection of the Charter and of national 
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fundamental rights.”151 The new arrangement recognizes the strategic role of 
constitutional courts and assures the autonomy of Member States as well as 
the Charter’s prominent role in fundamental rights protection. The CJEU 
has interpreted Art. 53 as mandating the CJEU to engage in dialogue with 
constitutional courts.  However, there is a risk that for the purpose of the 
uniformity of EU law, the level of protection of fundamental rights is 
compromised. Rather than applying the high standard provided for by the 
Spanish constitution, the CJEU chose to apply the lower standard afforded 
by the EU provision in the Melloni case. However, in the context of the 
European Arrest Warrant, Art. 53 should not be used as it is a fully 
regulated area of EU law. For such areas, the level of protection is limited 
by the requirement of respecting the uniformity and autonomy of EU law. 
Thus, the provision is not to be looked upon as a provision seeking to ensure 
the best protection possible. The principle of ne bis in idem, is another 
example of a fully regulated area of EU law, for which Art. 53 should not 
apply. The Charter is the starting point of interpretation on fundamental 
rights, at the top of the normative hierarchy.  The CJEU uses it to provide 
for the continuous protection of individual rights and liberties. To this end, 
it is “a purposive document;” its aim being to guarantee and protect the 
rights and freedoms it enshrines, within reasonable limits. Arguably, an 
interpretation of the Charter as a purposive document justifies a ruling like 
Åkerberg Fransson, in which the CJEU applied an autonomous 
interpretation of Art. 50 CFREU, without considering the lack of consensus 
between the Member States of the Council of Europe in relation to Art. 4 of 
Protocol 7. In other words, Art. 50 CFREU sets out its own uniform 
standard of protection of the ne bis in idem principle between the twenty-
eight EU Member States. In the particular case of ne bis in idem, reliance on 
the ECHR standards is not compulsory.
152
 
3.5 Summary: Art. 51-53 as interpreted by 
the CJEU 
To conclude, by review of Melloni, Toshiba and Åkerberg Fransson, the 
CJEU seems to have adopted a broad interpretation of Art. 51 in Åkerberg 
Fransson, in the sense that the contested national laws did not necessarily 
have to be a result of implementation of EU law in order for the Charter to 
apply. Thus, “implementation of EU law” does not mean implementation in 
the strictest sense. The CJEU adopted a partially autonomous interpretation 
of Art. 52(3) in Åkerberg Fransson and Toshiba Corporation. In relation to 
the principle of ne bis in idem, the requirement to interpret Art. 50 CFREU 
in line with the corresponding Art. 4 to Protocol 7 ECHR is not compulsory. 
After review of Melloni, it is uncertain how Art. 53 should be interpreted. 
However, so long as it protects fundamental rights to a higher standard than 
the Charter, Art. 53 will clearly not allow for the Member States to deviate 
from the principle of supremacy of EU law in favour of their own national 
constitutions. 
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4 Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
4.1 Why accession when there is the 
Charter?  
Despite the CJEU’s development of fundamental rights through general 
principles, the CJEU has repeatedly been criticized for not having a genuine 
commitment commitment to the protection of human rights and for being 
more interested in advancing other objectives of economic or political 
character. It has been accused of using human rights as a pretext to extend 
its influence into other fields of law. Some critics have asserted that the 
CJEU used fundamental rights as a rhetorical method, whereas in practice, 
the Court worked for advancing commercial goals of the EU. For example, 
it would use the headline “market rights” for the purpose of promoting the 
integration of the single market. Another reason for directing scepticism 
towards the CJEU’s transformation into a “human rights court,” has been 
that this was not its function under the Treaties. Moreover, the ECtHR is a 
much more apt court to interpret human rights as it was established for that 
purpose, and as it had acquired an expertise that the CJEU falls short of.
153 
 
As discussed in Section 3, the Charter is to a certain extent a 
codification of rights that already exist in the ECHR. It was not drawn up 
for the purpose of replacing the ECHR. One can wonder, given that the EU 
today has a legally binding catalogue of its own which contains a 
requirement of harmonious interpretation, would accession to the ECHR 
actually add anything to the present system of fundamental rights protection 
within the EU? The answer to this question is affirmative, as accession 
would have the effect of enhancing the uniform protection of fundamental 
rights further. It enables individuals to address the EU for violations of the 
ECHR in front of the ECtHR, which would, as a result of accession, be able 
to scrutinize EU acts.
154
 The problem that the EU currently cannot be held 
directly responsible in front of the ECtHR became apparent in the case 
Conolly.
155
 Under certain circumstances, individuals can hold EU Member 
States responsible for violating the ECHR, which has been confirmed in e.g.  
Matthews vs. UK
156
 and Bosphorus v Ireland.
157
 In these cases, Member 
States were alleged for violations of the ECHR in lieu of the EU. However, 
responsibility can only arise if the Member State was implementing EU law 
and if it had any discretion when doing so, which was the case in e.g. MSS 
v. Belgium and Greece. By contrast, if a Member State implements a EU 
measure (e.g. a regulation) which does not leave it any room for discretion, 
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responsibility for violations of the ECHR cannot arise. As accession would 
enable individuals to address applications directly against the EU for 
violations of the ECHR, an obvious judicial gap would be closed.
158
 
Furthermore, given that the EU exercises powers that are transferred by the 
Member States, an extension of the ECtHR’s control to the EU is logical. 
Moreover, the EU requires that Member States that wish to enter the Union 
are Contracting Parties to the ECHR. Therefore, it seems quite odd that the 
EU itself stands outside the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. It is about time that 
the EU itself accedes to foster its credibility on human rights issues.
159
 
4.2 The main obstacles to accession 
In order for the EU to be able to accede to the ECHR, two main obstacles 
had to be removed. The TEC needed to be amended in order for the EU to 
acquire competence to accede to the ECHR, an obstacle anticipated by the 
CJEU in its Opinion 2/94 of 1996. Moreover, the Convention itself had to 
be revised in order for the EU to adhere to it. Previously, only states could 
be parties to the ECHR. The EU’s accession to the Convention required, 
besides the agreement of the EU and its Member States, approval by all the 
47 Member States of the Council of Europe. Thus, there have been quite a 
few players in the negotiations on the terms of accession. Amongst these, 
Russia blocked the negotiations for several years due to its failure to ratify 
Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR.
160
 This explains why the provision permitting 
the EU to accede to the Convention did not enter into force until 2010. As a 
consequence of the ratification of Protocol 14., Art. 52(2) of the ECHR 
henceforth states, “the European Union may accede to this convention.” The 
EU’s competence to adhere to the ECHR was achieved through the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended Art. 6(2) of the TEU. This 
provision states, “The Union shall accede to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession 
shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.”161  
4.3 The specific characteristics of the 
Union  
Art. 6(2) of the TEU places the EU under the duty to accede to the ECHR. 
However, the provision does not specify the exact scope of that duty. 
Nothing requires the EU to accede under all circumstances, regardless of the 
content of the accession agreement. On the other hand, is seems clear that 
the EU and its Member States cannot reject accession outright. As the 
Treaty stipulates that the CJEU shall accede, a “minimal accession” would 
logically not conflict with the autonomy of the EU legal order, or else the 
wording of the article would have been different. Such a minimal accession 
must nevertheless include a possibility for review by the ECtHR of EU 
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provisions alleged of violating the ECHR. Obviously, an agreement that 
allows an external court to scrutinize EU law is expected to conflict with the 
autonomy of EU law. It is crucial that the exact ramifications for review of 
EU law by the ECtHR as they are laid down in the accession agreement 
preserves the autonomy of the CJEU as well as the ECtHR.
162
 In attempt to 
ensure that the autonomy of EU law will be preserved following accession, 
the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty stipulated Protocol (No. 8) relating to Art. 
6(2) of the TEU on the accession of the EU to the ECHR.
163
 It stipulates:  
 
Article 1 
The agreement relating to the accession of the Union to the European Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘European Convention’) provided for in Article 6(2) of the 
Treaty on European Union shall make provision for preserving the specific 
characteristics of the Union and Union law, in particular with regard to:  
 
(a) the specific arrangements for the Union's possible participation in the control 
bodies of the European Convention;  
 
(b) the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-Member States 
and individual applications are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the 
Union as appropriate. 
 
Article 2 
The agreement referred to in Article 1 shall ensure that accession of the Union 
shall not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions. It 
shall ensure that nothing therein affects the situation of Member States in relation 
to the European Convention, in particular in relation to the Protocols thereto, 
measures taken by Member States derogating from the European Convention in 
accordance with Article 15 thereof and reservations to the European Convention 
made by Member States in accordance with Article 57 thereof. 
 
Article 3 
Nothing in the agreement referred to in Article 1 shall affect Article 344 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
 
In the EU hierarchy of norms, international agreements are of higher rank 
than secondary law but subordinate to primary law. Given that the 
agreement on accession must not affect the EU's competences as defined in 
the Treaties, the Draft agreement must comply with the requirements set out 
by Protocol. No. 8. If the agreement was inconsistent with the conditions set 
out therein, it will be rejected by the CJEU in an opinion under Art. 
218(11).
164
 The protocol does not provide any further guidance on what “the 
specific characteristics of the Union and Union law” refer to. But given that 
the CJEU has based its reasoning on the concept of autonomy in several 
cases and opinions, one can assume that Protocol No. 8 refers to the 
autonomy of the EU legal order. Thus, it is justified to assess the draft 
agreement by the standards set by the CJEU’s in its case law the autonomy 
of EU law.
165
  
                                                 
162 Lock, 2011, p. 1033.  
163 OJ, 2010, C 83/273. 
164 Baratta, p. 1322 f. 
165 Lock 2011, p. 1033.  
 43 
4.4 The autonomy of EU law  
Due to the requirements set out in Protocol No. 8 to the Lisbon Treaty, one 
of the major challenges to the EU’s accession to the ECHR has certainly 
been the autonomy of the EU legal order. Indeed, it has been a difficult task 
for the drafters to ensure a high level of protection of human rights while 
simultaneously satisfying political demands and ensuring the autonomy of 
the EU legal order. The past draft agreements have not succeeded in 
overcoming this obstacle.  The CJEU has asserted the autonomy of EU law 
and explained the meaning thereof in several opinions and cases. By review 
of the CJEU’s case law a distinction can be drawn between the internal 
dimension of autonomy and the external dimension of autonomy. The 
former encapsulates the relationship between the EU’s legal order and the 
domestic legal orders of its Member States, and the latter encapsulates the 
relationship between the EU legal order and international law. The landmark 
case Costa v. ENEL from 1964, discussed in Chapter 2.1 was the first case 
on the internal dimension. In this case, the CJEU declared “…that the law 
stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because 
of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal 
provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as 
Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being 
called into question.”166 The CJEU argued that the principle of supremacy 
was needed in order to preserve the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. From 
this case and onwards, the CJEU has continuously asserted the principle of 
autonomy towards the Member States’ legal orders.167 For instance, it was at 
the heart of the Melloni-case.  
With regard to the external dimension, the CJEU has emphasized the 
importance of the autonomy of the EU’s legal order in several opinions. 
Most famously, it declared that the EU lacked competence to adhere to the 
ECHR
.168
 In this opinion, the Court reflected whether Art. 235 TEC 
constituted a legal basis for accession to the ECHR. The article was 
designed to apply where there were no specific provisions of the Treaty that 
conferred powers on the institutions to act, and when such powers appeared 
to be necessary to “enable the Community to carry out its functions with a 
view to attaining one of the objectives laid down by the Treaty.”169 The 
Court reached the conclusion that accession, being “Such a modification of 
the system for the protection of human rights in the Community, with 
equally fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for 
the Member States, would be of constitutional significance and would 
therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of Article 235.” Accordingly, 
accession could only occur if the Treaties were amended.
170
 The external 
dimension of autonomy had been highlighted by the CJEU previously,
171
 on 
the first draft agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA).
172
 Later 
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on, the CJEU reaffirmed the meaning of the autonomy of EU law. The 
CJEU identified two aspects of the external dimension of autonomy; 
“Preservation of the autonomy of the Community legal order requires 
therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the Community 
and its institutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered [...]Second, 
it requires that the procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the 
rules of the European Common Aviation Area Agreement and for resolving 
disputes will not have the effect of binding the Community and its 
institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular 
interpretation of the rules of Community law referred to in that 
agreement.”173 Consequently, an external court must not interpret the 
Treaties in an internally binding fashion.
174
 
In 8 March 2011,
175
 the Court held that the EU may be subjected to 
the external control of an international court, provided that the autonomy of 
EU law was not adversely affected. It stipulated that “As regards an 
international agreement providing for the creation of a court responsible for 
the interpretation of its provisions, the Court has, it is true, held that such an 
agreement is not, in principle, incompatible with European Union law.” 
However, the submission of the EU to an external court must not change the 
character of the CJEU’s key functions as set out in the Treaties or adversely 
affect the autonomy of the EU legal order.
176
   
In the light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the autonomy of 
the EU has been a central issue in the negotiations on accession to the 
ECHR. However, it is quite interesting that the EU has been so reluctant 
towards being supervised by an external court. Given that the EU itself was 
founded as an international organization, it appears hypocritical that it 
emphasizes its autonomy to the extent that it does towards international law. 
Similarly, the CJEU has on several occasions compromised of the autonomy 
of the Member States legal orders while proclaiming the supremacy of the 
EU legal order. The CJEU’s case law on the autonomy of the legal EU order 
illustrates the EU’s emancipation from an international organization to what 
can be described as a “supranational entity“, similar to a federal state. Even 
though the principle of supremacy and the autonomy of the legal order as 
stemming from the Treaties, are generally accepted among the Member 
States, the Treaties can nevertheless provide for limits to these principles. 
One provision that could be interpreted as such a limit is Art. 6(2), which 
requires the EU’s accession to the ECHR.177 
4.5 On the road to accession  
The task of drafting an agreement on accession of the EU to ECHR has been 
a difficult one. The agreement on accession needed to address a number of 
issues. Adjustments of the ECHR with regard to the specificity of the EU 
legal order needed to be made, including the controversial question of how 
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to integrate two international judiciaries. They had to achieve this without 
compromising the ECtHR’s authority of making the final ruling regarding a 
provision of EU law alleged of violating of the ECHR.
178
  
In March 2010, the Commission proposed negotiation Directives for 
the EU’s accession to ECHR. In May 2010, the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe designated the Steering Committee for Human Rights 
(hereafter the CDDH) through an ad-hoc mandate for the purpose of 
drawing up the necessary legal documents in order to enable the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR. In June 2010, the Commission received negotiating 
mandate by the Council to negotiate on the Council’s behalf. Henceforth, 
negotiators from the Commission and experts from the CDDH met regularly 
to work on the accession agreement.
179
 This joint process began with a 
meeting between the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn 
Jagland, and the Vice-President of the European Commission, Viviane 
Reding, on the 7 July 2010 in Strasbourg, where they discussed how 
accession will enable the European citizens to benefit from stronger and 
more coherent European fundamental rights protection. “Today is a truly 
historic moment. We are now putting in place the missing link in Europe's 
system of fundamental rights protection, guaranteeing coherence between 
the approaches of the Council of Europe and the European Union,” said 
Vice-President Viviane Reding, the EU's Commissioner for Justice, 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. “The EU has an important role to play 
in further strengthening the Convention's system of fundamental rights. We 
already have our own Charter of Fundamental Rights, which represents the 
most modern codification of fundamental rights in the world. This is a very 
good precondition for a successful meeting of the minds between the 
negotiation partners.” Thorbjørn Jagland stated that “The European 
Convention on Human Rights is the essential reference for human rights 
protection for all of Europe. By accepting to submit the work of its 
institutions to the same human rights rules and the same scrutiny which 
apply to all European democracies, the European Union is sending a very 
powerful message – that Europe is changing – and that the most influential 
and the most powerful are ready to accept their part of responsibility for that 
change and in that change.”180 The instruments on the accession of the EU 
to the ECHR will consist of; the Accession Agreement; a explanatory report 
to the Accession Agreement; a declaration by the EU; a rule to be added to 
the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution 
of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements in cases to which the 
EU is party and; a memorandum of understanding, all of which are are 
equally necessary for the accession of the EU to the Convention.
181
 
The final version of the Accession Agreement is from June 2011. This 
Draft agreement, which consists of twelve articles, has the purpose of 
preserving “the equal rights of all individuals under the Convention, the 
rights of applicants in the Convention procedures, and the equality of all 
High Contracting Parties.” The control mechanism of the ECHR is 
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preserved to a great extent; it applies to the EU in the same way as to the 
other Contracting Parties to teh ECHR. The preamble to the Draft 
Agreement stipulates that “the European Union is founded on the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” and that “accession of the 
European Union to the Convention will enhance coherence in human rights 
protection in Europe.” Moreover, it stresses that “the individual should have 
the right to submit the acts, measures or omissions of the European Union to 
the external control of the European Court of Human Rights.” Lastly, it 
acknowledges that accession requires certain adjustments to the Convention 
system, which need to be made by common agreement, due to “the specific 
legal order of the European Union.”182  
The report from October 2011 by the CDDH to the Committee of 
Ministers on the elaboration of legal instruments to accession states that “the 
EU would, as a matter of principle, accede to the Convention on an equal 
footing with the other Contracting Parties, that is, with the same rights and 
obligations.” However, due to the fact that the EU is not a State, some 
adaptations to the ECHR were necessary. The CDDH made minor changes 
to this draft and called a meeting for the purpose of discussing this draft, 
which took place 12-14 October 2011. Several of the delegations were of 
the opinion that the current draft instruments reflected an “acceptable and 
balanced compromise” of the parties’ different views. . However, because of 
political implications with regard to certain pending issues that could not be 
solved at the time for this meeting the CDDH decided that it could do 
nothing more as a steering committee. Thus, it passed on this report and the 
amended draft instruments to the Committee of Ministers for consideration 
and further guidance.
183
  On 13 June 2012 the Committee of Ministers gave 
a new mandate to the CDDH to pursue negotiations with the EU, in an ad 
hoc group “47+1,” with a view to finalise the legal instruments setting out 
the modalities of accession of the EU to the ECHR. This negotiation group 
held in total five meetings with the European Commission. The last 
negotiation meeting between the CDDH and the Commission took place on 
the 3 to 5 April 2013 which is also when the Draft agreement was 
finalised.
184
 The final report is from the Council of Europe to the CDDH 
concerning this meeting is from June 2013.
185
 The Draft agreement is 
currently subject to an opinion
186
 by the CJEU under Art. 218(11) TFEU; 
the Court was requested by the Commission to rule on the draft’s 
compatibility with the Treaties as negotiated up to April 2013 on 4 July 
2013.
187
 Provided that the CJEU considers the current draft compatible with 
the Treaties, the agreement on accession will be concluded between the 
forty-seven contracting parties to the Council of Europe and the EU in 
accordance with Art. 218 TFEU. According to this provision, after having 
obtained the consent of the European Parliament, the Council shall 
unanimously adopt a decision concluding an agreement on the EU’s 
                                                 
182
 CDDH-UE(2011)16, Final Version, Strasbourg, 19 July 2011, p. 2 f. 
183
 CDDH(2011)009, Strasbourg, 14 October 2011.p. 2 ff. 
184
 47+1(2013)007, Strasbourg, 2 April 2013 
185
 47+1(2013)008rev2, Strasbourg, 10 June 2013.   
186
 Opinion 2/13, pending. 
187
 Baratta 2013, p. 1505.  
 47 
accession to ECHR. Subsequently, the agreement must be ratified by all the 
EU Member States, as well as the Contracting Parties to the ECHR which 
are not Member States to the EU, in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements.
188
   
4.6 External control by the ECtHR  
The fact that the ECtHR will be able to scrutinize EU law as a result of 
accession raises the question of whether the ECtHR will interpret EU law in 
a binding manner. Moreover, it raises the question of whether the ECtHR 
will be able to declare EU acts to be invalid.  
With regard to whether the ECtHR will interpret EU law in a binding 
manner, the ECtHR considers the domestic provisions of the states that are 
parties to the case facts. It is for the national court to interpret and apply 
national law once it has received necessary guidance by the ECtHR with 
regard to the convention, see e.g. the Huvig-case.
189
 Similarly, the ECtHR 
would interpret EU law in a binding manner. Nevertheless, the ECtHR 
might need to assess legal provisions under certain circumstances, e.g. in 
order to decide whether a remedy is effective in accordance with Art. 13 
ECHR. But even so, the autonomy of the EU legal order would not be 
threatened, as the ECtHR would only rule on whether there was a violation 
of the ECHR in the concrete scenario.   
As for the question of whether the ECtHR will be able to declare EU 
acts to be invalid, the ECtHR’s judgments are of declaratory nature and are 
only binding under international law. They have no automatic direct effect 
for the domestic legal orders of the parties to the ECHR; their domestic 
effect depends on the parties to the case. This is evident from an 
examination of the provision on “Binding force and execution of 
judgments,” Art. 46 ECHR. Paragraph 1 to this provision states that “the 
High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the 
Court in any case to which they are parties.” The article says nothing about 
the effects of the ECtHR’s judgments on national law.190 Thus, the ECtHR, 
will obviously not be able to declare EU measures void, in the same way 
that it has never been able to declare acts of any of the other Contracting 
Parties to be invalid. The ECtHR does not have the objective of deciding on 
what the substantive content of EU law in general should be.
191
 Hence, also 
the answer of the second question is that it would have no substantial effects 
for the autonomy of the legal order and the CJEU is the remains the only 
court that can declare EU measures invalid.  
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4.7 Other issues with regard to the 
autonomy of EU law  
The negotiations have also involved many other complex legal issues with 
regard to the autonomy of EU law. Who will be the correspondent before 
the ECtHR in a case concerning a EU measures violation of the ECHR? 
Should inter-state complaints be excluded from the ECtHR’s jurisdiction in 
order to preserve the autonomy of EU law? Will it be possible for the 
ECtHR to ask for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU?
192
 As the negotiators 
have finalized the Draft agreement on accession of the EU to the ECHR, the 
solutions provided for by the draft to these problems are final
193
. The scope 
of accession has also been defined. According to Art. 1 of the Draft 
agreement, the EU will accede to the ECHR, to the Protocol to the 
Convention and to Protocol No. 6.
194
  This means that the EU will accede to 
the protocols that are ratified by all EU Member States.
195
 Consequently, it 
will inter alia not ratify Art. 4 to Protocol 7 ECHR. The issues described 
below are some of the most problematic and contentious issues of accession 
with regard to the autonomy of the EU legal order. Certain questions are left 
to the ECtHR to decide the future upon.
196
  
4.8 The Draft agreement’s solutions  
4.8.1 The prior involvement mechanism  
The prior involvement mechanism is set out in Art. 3.6 of the Draft 
agreement and stipulates the following:  
 
6. In proceedings to which the European Union is co-respondent, if the Court of Justice of 
the European Union has not yet assessed the compatibility with the Convention rights at 
issue of the provision of European Union law…sufficient time shall be afforded for the 
Court of Justice of the European Union to make such an assessment and thereafter for the 
parties to make observations to the Court…197 
 
The mechanism is designated to allow “internal control by the CJEU over 
the ECtHRs external supervision.” The CJEU will rule on the interpretation 
of EU primary law and the validity of EU acts alleged of violating the 
ECHR while the case is still pending in the ECtHR. The aim of this 
mechanism is to preserve the final jurisdictional role of the ECtHR as well 
as the key function of the CJEU in the European integration process. The 
prior involvement mechanism has been a controversial element of the 
negotiations. It is questionable whether it contradicts the nature of the 
ECHR’s judicial control. Moreover, it is necessary to find its relevant 
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justification within the EU legal framework. As the prior-involvement 
mechanism would have to be added to the CJEU’s functions set out in the 
Treaties, it might require revision of the EU Treaties.  
The mechanism has been subject to substantial criticism. For instance, 
the mechanism is alleged of privileging the EU over the other parties to the 
ECHR, as there is no similar mechanism that allows their constitutional 
courts to assess a national law alleged of violating the ECHR before the 
ECtHR rules on the matter. Moreover, the prior mechanism has been alleged 
of endangering the autonomy of the ECtHR as it is unlikely to contradict a 
previous ruling by the CJEU.
198
 Besides the fact that it would privilege the 
EU legal order over national legal orders, the prior involvement mechanism 
would in all likelihood result in delays to the proceedings before the EctHR, 
which are already considerably long. In addition, it would be difficult for 
the ECtHR to assess which cases that ought to be referred to the CJEU 
without pre-judging the outcome of the case.
199
  
 Roberto Baratta is of the opinion that the prior involvement 
mechanism “matches the ECHR’s features” as well and the conditions set 
out in EU law. In addition, he considers that it does not require revision of 
the EU Treaties.
200
 It is coherent with the ECHR due to the subsidiary 
character of the ECtHR set out in Art. 1, 13 and 53(1) ECHR. As explained 
in chapter 4.5.1, the ECtHR would simply consider the EU law provision at 
hand as part of the facts and determine whether there was a violation of a 
right guaranteed by the ECHR in the case at hand.  Moreover, it is an apt 
solution considering that the parties to the ECHR enjoy a margin of 
discretion which allows them to give due regard to their local specificities 
when implementing provisions of the ECHR. In the same way, this “margin 
of appreciation”-doctrine would apply for the EU. As the CJEU would be 
able to rule on a matter before it reaches the ECtHR, the latter would be able 
to take into account the CJEU's perspective.  
 Similarly, it is coherent with the EU legal order, in which the 
preliminary ruling procedure is one of its founding principles that 
constitutes an essential part of the features of the EU legal order and a 
“cooperative instrument” for protecting individual rights. The prior 
involvement mechanism appears to reflect the preliminary ruling procedure 
and is therefore an important contribution to the Draft agreement with the 
aim of preserving the “specific characteristics of the Union and Union law” 
as set out in Protocol No. 8 TEU. It safeguards the CJEU's role as the only 
court that can declare EU measures to be invalid.  It allows the ECtHR to 
apply EU law on the basis of the previous interpretation by the CJEU, which 
remains the ultimate interpreter of EU law. To reject the prior involvement 
mechanism would undermine the specificity of the EU legal order and the 
hierarchical relationship between the national courts and the CJEU, as it 
would deprive the CJEU of the possibility to assess the contested EU law 
(and if necessary declare it invalid) before it reaches the ECtHR.
201
 The 
Treaties need not to be revised in order to include he prior involvement 
mechanism, as the CJEU would not be called upon by the national courts, 
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but by the Member State(s) or the Commission. The fact that the Member 
State(s) or the Commission are sued before the ECtHR as defendants or co-
defendants is irrelevant.  As declared by the CJEU in its Opinions 1/00 and 
1/09, international agreements may confer new powers on the EU 
institutions, provided that they do not change the nature of the powers 
conferred on the institutions by the Treaties. Arguably, the prior 
involvement mechanism is merely resuming a power already conferred to 
the CJEU; the power to give preliminary rulings in cases which calls into 
question the interpretation or validity of EU law. The fact that the ECtHR 
would be able to ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in the same way as 
national court does not alter the essential character of Art. 267 TFEU. 
Moreover, Art. 19(1) TEU stipulates that the CJEU “shall ensure in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.” The aim 
of the prior involvement mechanism is to ensure that the CJEU's key 
function in the EU legal order is preserved in the Draft agreement. By virtue 
of the prior involvement mechanism, the Draft agreement, as it stands, 
strikes the right balance of the conditions set out in Protocol No. 8.
202
  
4.8.2 The correct respondent  
The majority of the complaints brought before the ECtHR are applications 
by individuals under Art. 34 ECHR.  Following accession, as the EU could 
be held responsible before the ECtHR, it will be crucial for the individual to 
know whether to address a complaint against the EU or the Member State. 
He or she might not be aware of “the intricacies surrounding 
implementation of EU law” and even so, it might be difficult to locate 
where the alleged violation of ECHR occurred.
203
 Prior to accession, the EU 
could not be held responsible before the ECtHR. Consequently, any 
application against the EU was declared inadmissible rationae personae. By 
contrast, EU Member States, being Contracting Parties to the ECHR, could 
not escape its responsibilities under the ECHR by transferring competences 
to the EU. This became clear in Matthews,
204
 which concerned the violation 
of free elections under Art. 3 in Protocol 1 ECHR. Elections to the European 
Parliament were regulated by the EC act on direct elections of 1976. 
However, this act applied only to the UK and citizens of Gibraltar were 
excluded from the right to vote and stand as candidates. The ECtHR held 
the UK responsible for violating the right to free elections as enshrined in 
the ECHR in lieu of the EU. Similarly, in Bosphorus, a case concerning 
violation of the ECHR, which had its origin in a EU regulation, the Member 
State was held responsible in lieu of the EU for breach of ECHR. However, 
the Member States responsibility for violation of the ECHR that has its 
origin in an EU action can only arise if the Member States authorities have 
acted in some way, or else the EU action would not be within the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction as set out in Art. 1 ECHR. This became apparent in Conolly
205
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In this case, which concerned a labour law dispute between the EU and one 
of its employees, there had been no action by any Member State. 
Consequently, the case was declared inadmissible by the ECtHR.  
Accession would clearly change the outcome of cases such as 
Conolly. In such a scenario, where none of the Member States have acted, 
the EU would be held directly responsible. However, it is uncertain who 
would be responsible in cases such as Matthews and Bosphorus, where 
violation of the ECHR has its origin in an EU act that the Member State has 
implemented, in other words, where both the EU and the Member States 
could be responsible of the violation. The drafters of the Lisbon Treaty 
foresaw this problem, which explains the wording of Art. 1(b) of Protocol 
No. 8 according to which the accession agreement shall make provision for 
preserving “the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law,” particularly 
with regard to (b) “the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by 
non-Member States and individual applications are correctly addressed to 
Member States and/or the Union as appropriate.” It is crucial that the 
solution provided for by the agreement on accession does not conflict with 
the principle of autonomy of EU law. For instance, it must not enable 
situations where a Member State would claim not to be responsible for the 
violation because the alleged action had its origin in EU law. Furthermore, 
in cases where the EU act is a directive, the solution cannot entail the 
ECtHR’s assessment of the responsible party of the violation, which would 
mean that it would have to interpret EU law in a binding manner.
206
 Against 
that backdrop, in cases where both the EU and the Member State could be 
held responsible, who should be the correct respondent? Should the Member 
State remain responsible? And if so, should it be responsible alone or 
alongside the EU? Or should the EU be the sole respondent, as it will be an 
EU institution that has adopted the EU act alleged of violating the 
ECHR?
207
 The solution provided by the Draft agreement is the co-
respondent mechanism. The mechanism was introduced by the CCDH in 
2002 and the various draft agreement has treated this provision rather 
differently. In the latest version, it is set out in Art. 3 of the latest Draft 
agreement. It amends Art. 36 ECHR so that the EU can become part of the 
proceedings. It stipulates the following:  
 
[…] 2. Where an application is directed against one or more member States of the 
European Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to the 
proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that 
such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the Convention rights at 
issue of a provision of European Union law, notably where that violation could have 
been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under European Union law. 
 
3. Where an application is directed against the European Union, the European Union 
member States may become co-respondents to the proceedings in respect of an 
alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into 
question the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of the 
Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or 
any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to those instruments, 
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notably where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an 
obligation under those instruments […] 208  
 
In contrast to the first version, the latest version requires only that court 
assess whether it appears that the compatibility of primary EU law with the 
ECHR was at issue. Hence, it would not involve a binding interpretation of 
EU law by the ECtHR. Moreover, the latest draft appears to succeed in 
circumventing situations the ECtHR would have to define the EU Member 
States obligations under EU law, which would conflict with the principle of 
autonomy of EU law. However, in Tobias Lock’s view, the best solution 
would be to re-define the co-respondent mechanism. According to him, a 
co-respondent should only join the proceedings by demand of the other 
respondent. As the first respondent would have to prepare its defence in the 
proceedings, it is more apt than the ECtHR to assess whether the EU or one 
or several Member State(s) should join the proceedings as co-respondent(s). 
Consequently, the ECtHR would not need to interpret EU law. Moreover, a 
specification of the responsibilities of the Member States under the Treaties 
would help preserve the autonomy of EU law.
209
   
An argument against the co-respondent mechanism has been that if it 
was introduced, the EU would be convicted of human rights violation 
disproportionately often. Moreover, it has been implied that any conviction 
of the EU would mean conviction of all the Member State. For these 
reasons, some scholars have argued that the Third party intervention 
provided for by Art. 36 ECHR is a more apt solution. However, this 
argument does not take into account the legal personality of the EU, which 
is not a mere “union of states.” Moreover, why is conviction of one Member 
State worse than conviction of all the Member States when, in reality, it is 
the EU measure that is being condemned? Last but not least, relying on the 
Third party intervention is a poor substitute for the co-respondent 
mechanism, as the former does not contain any obligation to intervene.   
As the EU and its Member States are not entirely separated from one 
other in the case of a Member State implementing EU law, possibility of 
holding the other non-acting party responsible as a co-respondent is a 
convenient mechanism in order to avoid gaps in accountability for 
violations of the ECHR and would enhance the effective protection of 
human rights in cases involving EU law.
210
  
4.8.3 Inter-Party complaints  
The previous two chapters refer solely to applications by individuals under 
Art. 34 ECHR. This chapter is about complaints by states under the 
provision on Inter-State cases, Art. 33 ECHR, according to which “Any 
High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the 
provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High 
Contracting Party.” Even though there has never been any inter-state 
complaints between EU Member States since the establishment of the EU and 
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that the mechanism plays a minor part the ECtHR’s “human rights protection 
machinery” considering that the Contracting Parties hardly ever employ the 
procedures to enforce human rights, Inter-state complaints constitute an 
important part of the ECHR which must be taken into account in the Draft 
agreement.211 Should such complaints be excluded from the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction in order to preserve the autonomy of EU law and the CJEU’s 
exclusive jurisdiction to rule on EU law? In the latest Draft agreement, the 
issue of inter-state complaints is dealt with very briefly. Art. 4 stipulates that 
“A Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of inter-Party 
applications submitted under Article 33.” Consequently, “The heading of 
Article 33 of the Convention shall be amended to read as follows: Article 33 
– Inter-Party cases.”212  
The change of name demonstrates that the EU, as a non-state entity, will 
be a full-fledged party to the ECHR after accession. The fact that, after 
accession, the EU and its Member States can be applicants as well as 
respondents to proceedings before the ECtHR, causes problems with regard to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU, the autonomy of EU law and, arguably, 
Art. 35(1) ECHR.213 According to Tobias Lock, the EU and its Member 
States should be excluded from the ECtHR’s jurisdiction with regard to Art. 
33 ECHR for the purposes of preserving the autonomy of EU law and the 
autonomy of the CJEU (Art. 344 TFEU). As far as the autonomy of EU law 
is concerned, issues between EU Member States or the EU and its Member 
State(s) “should not be dealt with outside the EU judiciary.”214 Moreover, 
there are already possibilities of judicial recourse for Member States. If a 
dispute relates to violation of the ECHR as well as interpretation and 
application of EU law, several internal dispute settlement mechanisms are 
applicable for the Member States and the EU institutions; infringement 
proceedings for failure to comply with the Treaties (Art. 258-259 TFEU); 
action for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU) and; action for failure to act (Art. 265 
TFEU).215 With regard to infringement proceedings, among the obligations 
arising from the Treaties is the obligation to comply with fundamental rights 
as guaranteed by the ECHR (Art. 6.3 TEU). With regard to actions for 
annulment, Member States are privileged applicants under Art. 263(2) 
TFEU; they can challenge any EU act without having to show that violation 
of rights guaranteed by the ECHR has occurred.
216
  
As of today, Art. 33 ECHR would be incompatible with Art. 344 TFEU 
which stipulates that “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of 
settlement other than those provided for therein.” This explains why the 
requirement set out in Protocol No. 8 TEU, was  included to preserve the role 
of the CJEU and its exclusive jurisdiction. However, not every dispute between 
the Member States and between the Member States and the EU about the 
ECHR relate to EU law. Thus, in such cases, Article 344 TFEU and the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU will not apply; Member States and the EU 
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will be able to submit cases to the ECtHR.217 In the case MOX Plant,218 the 
CJEU emphasised the importance of Art. 344 TFEU, which precludes Member 
States from initiating proceedings before other courts than the EU Courts, for 
the purpose of settling disputes relating to EU law.  Similarly, the principle of 
sincere cooperation, Art. 4(3) TEU, prohibits the EU institutions from 
submitting disputes concerning the interpretation or application of EU law to an 
external court. After accession, the ECHR will become an integral part of the 
EU legal order.  Consequently, according to Art. 19(1) TEU, the CJEU will 
have the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions of the 
ECHR in disputes between the Member States and between a Member State 
and the EU, provided that the dispute relates to EU law. Proceedings between 
Member States and the EU should therefore be excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR.
219
   
Arguably, the exclusion of disputes between the EU and its Member 
States from the ECtHR’s jurisdiction is needed not only in relation to the 
autonomy of EU law and the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction, but also with 
regard to the ECtHR. According to Art. 35(1) ECHR, the involvement of the 
CJEU is necessary in Inter-party cases between EU Member States and 
between the EU and its Member State(s). As the ECtHR is a subsidiary 
jurisdiction (Art. 35(1) ECHR), the domestic courts, which will include the 
CJEU after accession, must be given sufficient opportunity to remedy these 
violations themselves before ECtHR may decide on them. In cases of non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies, the case would be declared inadmissible by 
the ECtHR. Disputes between EU Member States or between the EU and its 
Member States must consequently be brought before the CJEU for two reasons. 
Firstly, due to the EU-internal provision of Art. 344 TFEU, and secondly, due 
to the international obligations under the Convention itself, namely Article 35 
(1) ECHR. If the Draft agreement contained an express provision contradicting 
the requirement in Art. 344 TFEU, it would certainly infringe the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU and the autonomy of EU law. Interestingly, the Draft 
agreement has left it open for the EU to decide on how to deal with inter-Party 
cases.220 Inter-states complaints can be excluded from the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction by way of agreement under the provision on “Exclusion of other 
means of dispute settlement,” Art. 55 ECHR. According to this provision,  
 
“The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they will not avail 
themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force between them for the purpose of 
submitting, by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of 
this Convention to a means of settlement other than those provided for in this Convention.”  
 
Art. 55 ECHR grants the ECtHR exclusive jurisdiction and priority in settling 
inter-State complaints between the Contracting Parties to the ECHR pursuant to 
Art. 33 ECHR and could possibly clash with its counterpart in Art. 344 TFEU. 
It is obvious that Art. 55 ECHR and Art. 344 TFEU are “diametrically opposed 
provisions,” as they both entitle the respective courts to exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over the same source of law - the ECHR. However, in contrast to 
Art.344 TFEU, Art. 55 ECHR is a flexible exclusive jurisdiction clause, which 
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explicitly acknowledges that the Contracting Parties to the Convention may 
choose to waive the ECtHR’s jurisdiction and settle their disputes before 
another court. Similarly, the Draft agreement accommodates the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU under Art. 344 TFEU and solves the jurisdictional 
conflict between ECtHR and CJEU as it indicates that proceedings before the 
CJEU do not constitute means of dispute settlement within the meaning of Art. 
55 ECHR. Accordingly, Art. 55 does not prevent the operation of the rule laid 
down in Art. 344 TFEU; neither the EU nor its Member States violate the 
ECHR if they submit disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
the ECHR, which will form an integral part of EU law, to the CJEU in lieu of 
the ECtHR.221 The EU and its Member States would have to conclude a 
special agreement explicitly referring to the ECHR stating that the ECHR 
will be interpreted by the CJEU in cases between the Member States or 
between a Member State and the EU. Such an agreement would preserve the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU while simultaneously being in 
accordance with the requirements of the ECHR.
222
  
This leaves the EU and its Member States with the procedures provided 
for by the Treaties to settle disputes concerning the interpretation and 
application of the ECHR between them, before they may bring a case to the 
ECtHR. The Member States may use infringement proceedings under Art. 259 
TEU in disputes between them and the action for annulment under Art. 263(2) 
TFEU or the action for failure to act under Article 265(1) TFEU against the 
EU. The only solution open to the EU in order to settle disputes with its 
Member States before it may submit an Inter-party complaint to the ECtHR is 
the provision on infringement proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU. However it 
can only do so, if the Member State in question has in fact implemented EU 
law. To conclude, all Contracting Parties will be able to bring a case against the 
EU and vice versa. However, the CJEU may determine that a Member State has 
failed to fulfill its obligations under Art. 344 TFEU - to not submit disputes 
concerning the interpretation of the treaties to another court, if it has submitted 
an Inter-party application before the ECtHR. Additionally, pursuant to Art. 
35(1) ECHR, the CJEU must be given a chance to remedy alleged violations of 
the ECHR before the ECtHR may rule on any applications. Thus, the ECHR 
enables CJEU to interpret and apply EU law in order to preserve the autonomy 
of the EU legal order. The Member States and the EU are obliged to settle their 
disputes via the internal mechanisms such as infringement proceedings, action 
for annulment and action for failure to act before they make take their 
applications to the ECtHR.223  
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4.9 The overlap in jurisdictions and the 
Bosphorus presumption 
Whether the Bosphorus presumption will survive accession has never been a 
matter for the drafters of the Accession agreement. As the presumption was 
created by ECtHR in its case law, the Draft agreement cannot foresee its 
future. However, due to the emphasis in the Draft agreement’s preamble that 
the EU will be on equal footing with the other Contracting Parties of the 
Council of Europe, it is highly unlikely that the ECtHR will continue to 
privilege the EU with the Bosphorus presumption.  
As of today, the CJEU’s and the ECtHR’s jurisdictions overlap in two 
aspects. Firstly, the CJEU has developed a jurisdiction within the field of 
human rights from Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
224
 and onwards. 
Secondly, despite the fact that the CJEU is the only court that can declare 
EU measures invalid according to the Foto-frost-doctrine,
225
 there have been 
a number of challenges in the ECtHR of EU measures’ compatibility with 
the ECHR.
226
  
Hitherto, the two courts have managed a deferential relationship. The 
CJEU has never openly challenged the ECtHR’s interpretation of the 
ECHR. Moreover, it has frequently taken the relevant provisions of the 
ECHR into consideration when interpreting the Charter. Arguably, the 
CJEU has not only maintained the ECHR standard, but also helped in 
enhancing it. In the joint cases NS and M.E. and in the case MSS v. Belgium 
and Greece,
227
 it is apparent how the two European courts are staking their 
ground in the field of fundamental rights. Their relationship has become so 
internalized that one can hardly talk of the two courts’ cooperation as an 
external “policy matter.” In that sense, Art. 52(3), 52(7) and the related 
explanatory notes to the CFREU are a key provision that governs the 
relationship between the ECHR and the CFREU. However, in light of the 
CJEU’s interpretation of the provision in its recent case law, and the 
absence of explicit reference to the ECtHR’s case law, one can hardly assert 
that the CJEU strictly follows the ECtHR’s case law from the Lisbon 
Treaty’s entry into force. It appears rather as if the CJEU reflects an 
“eclectic and unsystematic” use of the ECtHR’s case law.228  
The Bosphorus ruling
229
, from 30 June 2005, is without doubt the 
most important ruling on the ECtHR’s jurisdiction over EU acts.230 In this 
case, the ECtHR ruled that it presumed that the Member State, when 
implementing EU law, complied with its obligations arising from the 
ECHR, on the basis that the EU provided a level of protection of human 
rights that was equivalent to that guaranteed by the ECHR. The ECtHR 
stipulated that “However, any such a presumption can be rebutted if, in the 
circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of the 
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Convention rights was manifestly deficient.”231 In the case at hand, there 
was no such dysfunction in the EU’s control system in order to rebut that 
presumption.
232
 The Bosphorus case called for concurring opinions, in 
which the judges expressed various concerns with regard to abandoning the 
case-by-case review of compliance for this quite abstract presumption. 
While agreeing that there had been no violation of the protection of property 
Art. 1Protocol No. 1 ECHR, they did not agree on certain parts of the Courts 
the reasoning.
233
  
The ECtHR’s reason for granting the EU with such a generous 
presumption is substantive; it is an acknowledgement by the Court that the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU – and by the CJEU – is of such 
high quality that the ECtHR need not exercise its jurisdiction, unless in the 
unexceptional event when the protection is manifestly deficient.
234
 Even 
though the judgment in Bosphorus was made two years before the Charter 
became legally binding, it had already existed for five years and was 
frequently cited by the CFI, AGs and the CJEU.
235
 The Charter contains a 
number of rights not enshrined in the ECHR, and for several rights it 
provides for more extensive protection than the corresponding rights in 
ECHR. Art. 52(3) allows for the CFREU to provide a more extensive 
protection for the rights that correspond to rights in ECHR. For instance, 
there is no possibility to restrict political activity of foreign nationals to a 
greater extent than the same activities of nationals in CFREU, while such a 
restriction is possible under Art. 16 ECHR. Another example is that the 
Charter doesn’t restrict the right to marriage between women and men, 
whereas the ECHR does so. 
However, it has been argued that this is not the real reason for the 
Bosphorus presumption. Firstly, it has been argued that the ECtHR wants to 
show comity towards the CJEU.
236
 It acknowledges the CJEU’s monopoly 
on declaring EU measures invalid and the fact that the EU is not bound by 
the ECHR. The Bosphorus presumption is the ECtHR’s way of avoiding 
conflict and showing respect towards the CJEU (arguably in return for the 
CJEU’s receptiveness towards the ECtHR’s case law over the years). 
Secondly, the Member States, all of whom are being parties to the ECHR, 
can in most cases be held responsible in lieu of the EU.
237
   
In contrast to Bosphorus, the ECtHR found that the Member States 
had violated Art. 3 ECHR in the case MSS v. Belgium and Greece. This case 
concerned an asylum seeker who had entered the EU via Greece, 
subsequently residing in Belgium. The latter had exercised a margin of 
appreciation when sending the person back to the country of first entry. 
Belgium should have ensured that, when sending the asylum seeker back to 
Greece, the standard of the asylum seeking system in the state of entry 
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complied with the rights guaranteed by ECHR. Due to the inadequacy of the 
Greek asylum seeking system, the Bosphorus presumption did not apply.
238
  
While awaiting accession, it appears that the ECtHR will continue to 
indirectly review EU acts, when they leave certain discretion to the Member 
States. By contrast, when the EU act at issue is e.g. a regulation, which 
leaves no discretion when implementing it the Member State will be 
presumed to have acted in compliance with the ECHR, in absence of 
contrary evidence of manifestly deficient protection of the rights guaranteed 
by the ECHR.
239
  
 However, once accession has taken place, the two reasons outlined 
above can no longer justify the presumption. Following accession, there will 
be no formal limits to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction of scrutinizing EU measures 
and the CJEU will be a domestic court to the ECtHR. The EU will be a 
party to the ECHR on equal footing with the other Member States of the 
Council of Europe. As the EU pursuant to the co-respondent can be a party 
to proceedings before the ECtHR, it can obviously not receive such special 
treatment. Thus, there is no reason why the EU should be privileged with a 
presumption that its acts are compatible with the ECHR.  
To conclude, The Bosphorus presumption will be hard to accept for 
the other parties to ECHR. They may claim similar treatment for their 
constitutional courts, or might even go as far as to refuse to sign the 
Accession agreement unless a specific provision is included in the Draft 
agreement, stating that the Bosphorus presumption must be abandoned 
following accession. Considering the fact that discussions on the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR have already been continuing for over thirty years, it 
is in everyone’s interest to not prolong the thirty-year long process to 
prolong further.
240
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5 Analysis 
Part I. The Charter  
5.1 Pre-Lisbon: Level of protection of 
fundamental rights and the autonomy 
of the EU legal order  
Prior to the existence of an EU fundamental rights catalogue, the CJEU 
elaborated an EU fundamental rights standard via general principles through 
inter alia 220 TEC (compare Art. 19 TEU). The considerable disadvantage 
of this strategy was that the CJEU was confined to the case in point. Thus, it 
could not elaborate the scope of and limits to the rights protected through 
general principles as distinctly and generally as needed. Due to the 
uncertainty of which right was protected in the EU fundamental rights 
standard, and the exact scope of and limits to those rights, the EU 
institutions could be unaware of the fact that they might be infringing these 
rights and, most importantly, it was difficult for individuals to know, had 
their rights been violated, whether they were guaranteed by fundamental 
rights within EU legal order. As a result of the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, general principles acquired constitutional recognition by virtue of 
Art. 6(3) TEU.  Simultaneously, by virtue of Art 6(1), the Charter acquired 
legal status. Henceforth, the rights and principles guaranteed in the Charter 
coexist with the rights guaranteed by general principles through recognition 
of the CJEU. Even though the protection of general principles might appear 
superfluous now that the EU has a legally binding fundamental rights 
catalogue which encapsulates the developments of the society up until this 
point, general principles will become useful in the future, when the society 
develops further and there is need for protection of fundamental rights not 
contained in the Charter. In my view, the Charter has contributed to the 
enhancement of protection of fundamental rights and the inclusion of the 
provision on general principles in Art. 6(3) TEU will allow the CJEU to 
enhance the fundamental rights protection further in the future.  
With regard to the internal dimension of the autonomy of EU law, the 
elaboration of fundamental rights through general principles was a means of 
protecting the principle of supremacy. Constitutional fundamental rights 
could not override EU law, therefore the EU needed to provide an equal 
standard of fundamental rights protection. However, it has been difficult for 
the national courts, in particular the German and Italian Constitutional 
Courts, to accept the fact that EU law was supreme to their national 
constitutions, particularly as the EU ultimately derives its legitimacy from 
the national constitutions.  As far as the external dimension of the autonomy 
of EU law is concerned, prior to the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, the EU 
had no binding catalogue of fundamental rights. When elaborating an EU 
fundamental rights standard through general principles, the CJEU drew 
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inspiration from the ECHR as an informal source. Thus, before the CFREU 
became legally binding, the relationship between the Charter and 
international law was not an issue.  
5.2 Post-Lisbon: Level of protection of 
fundamental rights  
By virtue of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU received its own legally binding 
fundamental rights catalogue that takes into account a number of 
developments and changes in the society and constitutes the most modern 
catalogue of fundamental rights in the world. By review of the line of case 
law in e.g. DEB and NS and M.E., it is apparent that the CJEU strives for its 
case law to be in line with that of the ECtHR. These cases contain 
considerable reviews of the explanatory remarks to the Charter, the 
corresponding provisions enshrined in the ECHR and the ECtHR's case law. 
The joined cases NS and M.E. concerned the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment.  The wording of the relevant provision, 
Art. 4 CFREU, is identical to the corresponding Art. 3 ECHR. Thus, the 
CJEU had no reason to deviate from the ECHR standard. The DEB-case 
concerned the right to a fair trial, enshrined in articles 47-48 CFREU and 
Art. 6 ECHR. According to the first list of the explanatory remarks, Article 
48 corresponds to Art. 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR. According to the second 
list, Art. 47(2) and (3) corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR, but the 
limitation to the determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal 
charges does not apply as regards EU law and its implementation. Thus, 
even though the wording of the provisions was not identical, the rights 
concerned partly belonged to the second list of the explanatory remarks and 
the fact that there were specific EU limitations to the CFREU rights, in the 
case at hand, there was no reason for the CJEU to not apply the ECHR 
standard.  
 Even though the CJEU did not refer to the ECHR in Toshiba 
Corporation and Åkerberg Fransson, it is doubtful that this absence of 
reference will have any substantial effects for the level of fundamental 
rights protection in Europe. Art. 53 ECHR constitutes a minimum standard. 
Moreover, the Convention is by now over sixty years old whereas the 
Charter is a modern fundamental rights catalogue that encapsulates the 
changes in the society over the last sixty years and offers in many aspects a 
higher level of protection than the ECHR. When estimating the risk of 
diverging interpretations, one must remember that both Art. 53 ECHR and 
Art. 53 CFREU are provisions on the minimum level of protection. Thus, 
the CJEU and ECtHR may interpret certain corresponding rights differently 
without compromising the level of protection of the respective fundamental 
rights catalogues. Moreover, for the great majority of rights that have been 
subject to proceedings before the CJEU, the Court has ensured that the 
rights enshrined in the Charter are interpreted in light with the 
corresponding provisions of the ECHR and the ECtHR’s related case law; 
resulting in a high level of protection of fundamental rights.  
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5.3 Post-Lisbon: the internal dimension of 
the autonomy of the EU legal order  
The general provisions on the application and interpretation of the Charter 
in Art. 51 and 53 have raised questions with regard to the internal dimension 
of the autonomy of EU law. The CJEU interpreted the phrase “only when 
implementing EU law,” in Art. 51 extensively, basically meaning ”within 
the scope of EU law.” In my view, it should have interpreted Art. 51 to 
mean implementation in the strictest sense, as that clearly was the intention 
of the drafters, particularly because of the choice of the word only. It 
appears strange that the fact that an EU law that precludes breaches of 
obligations to declare value added tax that is partly connected to the 
contested Swedish administrative penalty taxeringslagen (which was not a 
result of implementation itself) can be conceived as “implementation of EU 
law.” Similarly, the fact that EU law obliges Member States to take all 
legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection 
of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion, inter alia 
enshrined 4(3) TEU, serves as a fragile argument in support of the notion 
that the administrative penalty constituted implementation of EU law. 
Lastly, the fact that the Member States are under obligation to counter 
illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the European Union as 
enshrined in Art. 325 TFEU is not a convincing argument supporting that 
the contested law was a result of implementation of EU law. In my view, the 
approach adopted by the CJEU is a far too extensive interpretation of the 
field of application of the Charter that demonstrates where the EU’s 
interests truly lie. As far as I am concerned, the Charter should apply in 
situations of strict implementation of EU law, or else the wording of the 
provision should be different.” I agree with AG Cruz-Villalón in the sense 
that it appears dangerous to assert that, by means an EU directive, the 
legislature envisaged the transfer of all the constitutional guarantees 
governing the exercise of the Member States’ power to impose penalties 
(including the collection of VAT) from the Member States to the EU. The 
Åkerberg Fransson-case should in my opinion not have been considered a 
situation involving the implementation of EU law within the meaning of 
Art. 51(1) and the CJEU should have declared that it lacked jurisdiction to 
rule in the proceedings. The extensive approach with regard to the Charter’s 
application was a re-enforcement of the previous case law of the CJEU, 
notably the cases ERT etc. in which the CJEU proclaimed that Member 
States must act in accordance with the fundamental rights enshrined in EU 
law in situations governed by EU law. Where national legislation falls 
within the scope of EU law, situations cannot exist where the Charter 
doesn’t apply. The combination of the administrative and criminal penalties 
was accepted in EU law by virtue of the CJEU’s interpretation of Art. 50 
CFREU. By contrast, it would not have been accepted according to Art. 4 
Protocol 7 (which Sweden has ratified) if the case had reached the ECtHR, 
which has been the outcome of other disputes concerning the same 
combination of penalties that has been subject to review by the ECtHR. In 
this sense, the level of protection of the right not to be punished twice for 
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the same offence has been comprised by the interpretation chosen by the 
CJEU. However, as conceived by Rosas and Kaila, in acquiring legal status, 
the Charter should not lead to a rupture between the past and present. 
Arguably, the CJEU’s extensive approach with regard to Art. 51 CFREU 
was needed in order to not disrupt the internal dimension of the autonomy of 
the EU legal order and leads in fact, as conceived by judge Safjan, to an 
enhancement of the unity and coherence of EU fundamental rights. 
 With regard to the questions brought about by Art. 53 for internal 
autonomy, even though it is still uncertain exactly how certain expressions 
in the provisions should be interpreted, it is clear by review of the Melloni-
ruling that it does not allow any deviation of the principle of supremacy. 
Hence, the provision has not brought about any changes in the internal 
distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States. If the Spanish 
Constitutional Court had been allowed to apply the constitutional 
fundamental right in lieu of the contested EU directive, it would disrupt the 
well-established principle that the EU legal order was built on, and prevent 
EU law form applying uniformly throughout the EU. Given that the national 
court was prevented from applying the higher level of protection of 
fundamental rights protection guaranteed by the Spanish constitution, the 
Charter has in this sense not enhanced the level of protection of fundamental 
rights. However, the European Arrest Warrant (and the principle of ne bis in 
idem) belongs to fully regulated areas of EU law. For such areas, the Charter 
should be looked upon as a purposive document that allows the EU to set  
its own standard of protection between the EU Member States. 
Consequently, provided that the minimum level of protection guaranteed by 
ECHR is respected, the ECHR-standard will not necessarily apply in these 
areas. 
 Even though the CJEU was clear on what the provision doesn’t entail, 
it failed to clarify the meaning of Art. 53. The provision seems to repeat 
what is already stated in Art. 51 and 52 (3-4). An interpretation of Art. 53 
where it aims to govern the Charter's relationship with ECHR and the 
national constitutions would deprive these provisions of their effet utile. Art. 
53 has also been conceived as being specifically directed to one of the two. 
On the one hand, it has been interpreted as a provision encouraging the 
CJEU to engage in dialogue with the national courts. Arguably, it aims to 
mandate the CJEU to, when departing from or following the level of 
fundamental rights as preserved in the Member State’s national 
constitutions, provide reasons therefore. In this sense it is a reinforcement of 
the statement from the landmark-case Internationale Handelsgesellshaft, in 
which the CJEU proclaimed that it is bound to draw inspiration from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, while 
simultaneously it reinforces the autonomy of EU law. On the other hand, it 
has been interpreted as particularly seeking to prevent diverging 
interpretations of provisions contained in the Charter as well as the ECHR. 
If one rejects an interpretation where Art. 53 aims to monitor the Charter’s 
relationship with the ECHR and the national constitutions, it seems to be a 
general “minimum level of protection clause” almost identical to Art. 53 in 
the ECHR. In my view, one should not read in too much into Art. 53, as 
interpretations according to which it seeks to regulate the Charter’s 
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relationships with the ECHR or the Member States’ national constitutions 
renders Art.52(3) and 52(4) without purpose. As far as I am concerned, it 
simply seeks to ensure a minimum level of protection of the rights 
guranteed in the Charter, without for that matter allowing national 
Constitutional Courts to undermine the supremacy of EU law in relation to 
constitutional fundamental rights.  
5.4 Post-Lisbon: the external dimension 
of the autonomy of the EU legal order  
The CJEU’s treatment of the requirement set out in Art. 52(3) CFREU and 
its related explanatory remarks in Toshiba and Åkerberg Fransson appears 
to be the CJEU’s attempt to not interfere with the ECtHR’s case law on Art. 
4 to Protocol 7, a number of EU Member States non-reservations or 
ratifications in relation to this provision, to not open up for an interpretation 
of Art. 50 that would undermine the effectiveness of EU competition law 
and to not make the rights enshrined in the Charter (and accordingly the 
autonomy EU law) dependent on reservations and non-ratifications under 
national law.  Naturally, achieving all these objectives was a difficult task, 
which may explain the ambiguity of the CJEU’s reasoning and why the 
Court never provided for a clear meaning of the ne bis in idem principle as 
enshrined in EU law. In Åkerberg Fransson, the CJEU applied the Engel 
criteria, but without explicitly referring to the Engel-case and other cases on 
ne bis in idem in which the ECtHR had already, through application of these 
criteria, recognized the criminal nature of the contested Swedish tax penalty. 
The Court stipulated that Art. 50 CFREU does not preclude a Member State 
from imposing a combination of tax penalties and criminal penalties for the 
same acts of non-compliance with declaration obligations in the field of 
VAT, an interpretation of Art. 50 that conflicts with the interpretation 
adopted by the ECtHR on Art. 4 to Protocol 7 ECHR. However, given that it 
is for the national court to decide the outcome of the Åkerberg Fransson 
case, it is still uncertain whether Art. 50 CFREU does in fact preclude the 
combination of tax and criminal penalties at issue. Consequently, one can 
not draw the conclusion that Art. 50 CFREU offers a lower level of 
protection than the ECHR. Had the CJEU interpreted Art. 50 CFREU in line 
with Art. 4 to Protocol 7 ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law, it would have 
made the provision conditional upon the non-ratifications or reservations of 
certain EU Member States in relation to the ECHR which would endanger 
the autonomy of EU law and the level of protection of the rights enshrined 
in the Charter. However, the partially autonomous interpretation of Art. 50 
has the effect of nullifying the non-ratifications or reservations by certain 
Member States and is therefore arguably an extension of the field of 
application of the Charter and in breach of Art. 51 CFREU. To conclude, 
the CJEU’s ruling in Åkerberg Fransson does not provide much guidance 
on how the ne bis in idem principle as enshrined in EU law should be 
understood. Moreover, it does not clarify the Court’s exact duties pursuant 
to Art. 52(3) and the related explanatory marks. It appears that the CJEU 
does not necessarily need to follow the ECtHR’s case law or interpret rights 
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enshrined in the Charter in line with their corresponding provisions in the 
ECHR. At least, this appears to be the case for “non-core rights” in the 
second list of the explanatory remarks relating to Art. 52(3). However, the 
CJEU is likely to continue with the line of case law discerned in e.g. DEB 
and NS and M.E. for the vast majority of rights.  This resembles the Courts 
habit of drawing inspiration from the ECHR prior to the Lisbon Treaty’s 
entry into force. It appears that the CJEU still, to some extent, reflects an 
eclectic and unsystematic use of the ECHR. But as the EU is eager to 
demonstrate its achievements in the field of fundamental rights, and as it is 
about to become a Contracting Party to the ECHR, the fact that the CJEU 
did not refer to Art, 52(3) or explicitly referred to the ECtHR’s case law, is 
not an imminent threat against the level of protection of fundamental rights 
in the EU.   
 
Part II. Accession  
5.5 Effects of accession for the level of 
protection of fundamental rights 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR would clearly have the effect of  
enhancing the level of protection of fundamental rights. The CJEU has  
frequently been criticized of not having a genuine commitment to protect  
human rights; being more interested in advancing other objectives of  
economic or political character. The CJEU was never intended to be a  
“human rights court,” which has never been part of its key functions under  
the Treaties. The ECtHR is better suited for this task as it was established  
for that purpose and has acquired an expertise that the CJEU lacks.  
Moreover, the CJEU’s expanding jurisdiction in the field of fundamental  
rights has increased the risk of conflict of interpretation between the CJEU  
and the ECtHR. Accession would have the effect of enhancing the uniform 
protection of fundamental rights in a way that the Charter alone could never 
achieve, since it diminishes the risk of diverging interpretations of the CJEU 
and the ECtHR for corresponding rights, but more importantly, as it fills a 
judicial gap enabling individuals to address the EU for violations of the 
ECHR in front of the ECtHR, which would as a result of accession be able 
to scrutinize EU acts. 
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5.6 The Draft agreement and its effects for 
the specific characteristics of the EU 
and EU law 
5.6.1 The prior involvement mechanism 
The prior involvement mechanism appears to strike the balance of 
preserving the specific features of the ECtHR as well as the CJEU. In my 
view, the allegation that here is no similar mechanism for the domestic 
courts appears odd, as the preliminary ruling procedure is a unique feature 
of the EU legal order and applies only when a question regarding the 
interpretation or validity of EU law is at issue. The argument that it 
endangers the autonomy of the ECtHR as it is unlikely to contradict a 
CJEU-ruling is weak, as its jurisdiction is of subsidiary character. Thus, the 
ECtHR only have jurisdiction in disputes concerning violations of the 
ECHR once the applicant has exhausted all domestic remedies pursuant to 
Art. 1, 13 and 53(1). In that sense, the fact that the CJEU can clarify and if 
needed declare an EU-measure alleged of violating the ECHR invalid before 
it reaches the ECtHR is similar to the situation where national courts declare 
national law in breach of ECHR before it reaches the final jurisdiction.  
 The prior involvement mechanism preserves the autonomy of the EU 
and the CJEU’s role as the sole interpreter of EU law. In fact, the 
preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Art. 267 TFEU constitutes an 
essential feature of the EU legal order and the requirement to preserve the 
specific characteristics of the EU set out in Protocol No. 8 is arguably aimed 
at this mechanism. Moreover, the prior involvement mechanism safeguards 
the CJEU’s key functions as defined in Art. 19 TEU and 267 TFEU. Due to 
this mechanism, accession need not lead to a breach of the Foto-Frost 
doctrine, according to which the CJEU is the only court that can declare EU 
measures invalid. Arguably, revision of the Treaties is not needed as the 
prior involvement mechanism is not necessarily to be considered a new 
function of the CJEU, but merely resumption of a power already conferred 
to it in 19(1) TEU, according to which the CJEU shall “ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed,” and Art. 
267 TFEU according to which it shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and 
interpretation of EU-acts. In my view, the only negative result of the prior 
involvement proceedings is the long delays they may entail for the 
proceedings before the ECtHR which are already considerably long. The 
mechanism must not unjustifiably complicate the procedures before the 
ECtHR or make individual applications so burdensome that individual 
applicants are prevented in practice from seeking judicial relief in ECtHR.  
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5.6.2 The co-respondent mechanism 
The co-respondent mechanism is an important contribution to the Accession 
Agreement as hitherto, there has been a substantial judicial gap insofar as 
the EU can not be held responsible for violations of the ECHR. For cases 
like Conolly, where no Member State had acted, accountability could not 
arise even though an individual’s rights had been adversely affected. As far 
as I am concerned, it is strange that the ECtHR has been content with 
holding a Member State responsible in lieu of the EU. It seems unjust to 
hold the Member State responsible if it was clear that the violation had its 
origin in an EU act that the Member State had to implement according to its 
obligations set out in the EU Treaties. However, the ECtHR could obviously 
not have held a non-Contracting Party to the ECHR responsible for 
violations thereof. The argument that the EU would be held accountable 
more often than it should if it could join the proceedings as a co-respondent 
is weak. First and foremost, it would join alongside the Member State that 
had implemented the alleged EU act (or vice versa). Hence, the ECtHR 
would never decide on which of the two that was to blame or where the 
violation occurred. Secondly, as the Member State(s) that had implemented 
the alleged act would be parties to the proceedings, why would conviction 
of the EU mean conviction of all the EU Member States? Therefore, the 
solution currently provided for by the ECHR in Art. 36 (Third party 
intervention) is not enough, particularly because it doesn’t oblige the third 
party to participate in the proceedings before the ECtHR. If a EU measure 
was accused of violating the ECHR, and the EU was the respondent in 
proceedings before the ECtHR, it seems unlikely that the Member State that 
had implemented that EU measure would step forward unless obliged to do 
so. Similarly, it appears unlikely that the EU would intervene when its 
Member State(s) was respondent(s) to proceedings before the ECtHR. With 
regard to the question of whether it should be the ECtHR or the first 
respondent to the proceedings that should to ask the second party to join the 
proceedings as co-respondent, the fact that the ECtHR neither undertakes a 
binding interpretation of the alleged EU law, nor defines the Member 
State’s obligations under the Treaties, renders it unproblematic with regard 
to the autonomy of EU law for the Court to determine whether a third party 
should join the proceedings as co-respondent. Even though it is easy for the 
respondent already party to the proceedings to assess whether the other 
party ought to join the proceedings as co-respondent as it would be 
preparing its defense, it could easily lead to situations where the EU and its 
Member States would blame each other and debate on where exactly the 
violation of ECHR occurred. Therefore, it is more suitable that the ECtHR 
should decide on whether a third party should join the proceedings.  
5.6.3 Inter-Party complaints  
The choice to include the EU in the inter-state proceedings under Art. 33 
ECHR, or as the provision will be named after accession “Inter-Party 
proceedings,” is a suitable solution that preserves the autonomy of EU law 
while simultaneously placing the EU on equal footing with the other 
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Contracting Parties. This is because it will possible for the EU and its 
Member States to exclude such complaints from the ECtHR’s jurisdiction 
by way of agreement pursuant to Art. 55 ECHR, which is a solution open to 
all the Contracting Parties. If an Inter-party complaint is referred to the 
ECtHR that does not contain an element of EU law, the autonomy of the EU 
legal order and Art. 344 TFEU would not be negatively affected. If a EU 
Member State directed an Inter-Partly complaint towards the EU or another 
EU Member State for violation of the ECHR, that Member State could be 
sued before the CJEU for failure to fulfill its obligations under Art. 344 
TFEU. Last but not least, even though Inter-Party Complaints in theory 
could undermine the autonomy of EU law it should be noted that 
proceedings under Art. 33 ECHR was never likely to be an issue in the 
negotiations on accession as there has never been any Inter-State complaints 
among the EU Member States. Similarly, it is not a mechanism that is 
frequently used by the Contracting Parties to the ECHR.  
5.7 Is the Bosphorus-presumption likely 
to survive accession?  
As all the reasons for the ECtHR’s privileging the EU with the presumption 
that its fundamental rights protection is equivalent to that of the ECHR will 
no longer exist once accession has taken place, there is obviously no reason 
to continue with the presumption that has already faced substantial criticism. 
In my view, although the EU had a dignified fundamental rights standard in 
2005, it entailed risks and was unjust of the ECtHR to abandon the case-by-
case review in the Bosphorus-ruling. After accession, it would be even 
stranger to continue with the presumption as all arguments for granting the 
EU with it in the first place will have been removed. The ECtHR need not 
show comity towards the CJEU as after accession, which will become a 
domestic Court in relation to the ECtHR and there will no longer be any 
formal limits to the ECtHR’s ability to scrutinize EU measures. To continue 
with the Bosphorus presumption, would not only contradict the explicit 
statement in the Draft agreement, that the EU will accede on equal footing 
with the other Contracting Parties, but it would also be highly unjust to 
grant one of the parties with such as presumption as the EU could be a co-
respondent before the ECtHR.   
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6 Conclusion  
6.1 Effects of Art. 6(1) TEU 
As the EU fundamental rights protection solely based on the CJEU’s 
development of general principles in its case law proved insufficient, a 
legally binding catalogue of fundamental rights was necessary for a more 
reliable standard of EU fundamental rights. The Charter demonstrates the 
EU’s achievements in the field of fundamental rights being the most modern 
catalogue of fundamental rights in the world. In this sense, the EU has 
helped enhancing fundamental rights protection. It has made the 
fundamental rights guaranteed within the EU legal order more visible for the 
EU citizens as the rights are no longer scattered over a vast array of 
judgments, but summarized in a full-fledged legally binding catalogue with 
defined scopes and authorized limitations. The general provisions on 
governing the interpretation and application have been clarified to some 
extent in the CJEU’s recent case law. Art. 51 CFREU on the Charter’s field 
of application has been given a broad interpretation, similar to the 
application of general principles prior to the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into 
force. Apparently, the CJEU will have jurisdiction in any case falling within 
the scope of EU law, as stipulated of the explanatory remarks to Art. 51. 
Art. 52(3) on corresponding rights appears to have been given a partially 
autonomous interpretation, in the sense that the CJEU can chose to not 
apply this provision and not take account of the corresponding ECHR 
provision and the ECtHR’s case law for rights that fall within in fully 
regulated areas of EU law. However, for the majority of cases concerning 
fundamental rights, the CJEU refers to Art. 52(3), the ECHR and the related 
case law by the ECtHR. Art. 53 on the level of protection appears to be a 
general minimum standard clause that reinforces the autonomy of EU law 
but encourages the CJEU to provide for reasons when departing from 
national standards. In this sense, it is also a reinforcement of the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft-doctrine; the CJEU is bound to draw 
inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
The Charter constitutes a substantial collection of rights derived from a 
number of different fundamental rights instruments. It takes into account the 
developments of and changes in the society and has therefore modernized 
fundamental rights as it contains a great deal of rights that are not enshrined 
in the ECHR and other fundamental rights instruments from the 1950’s. It is 
a creditable summary of the fundamental rights that should be guaranteed in 
a fundamental rights catalogue of the 21
st
 century and demonstrates that the 
EU is not only interested in advancing political and economic objectives but 
is a front player when it comes to enhancing the level of protection of 
fundamental rights in the world. 
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6.2 Effects of Art. 6(2) TEU    
The EU’s accession to the ECHR enhances the level of fundamental rights 
protection in Europe as it enables the ECtHR to scrutinize EU-acts and to 
hold the EU responsible for violations of the ECHR. Accession fosters the 
EU’s credibility in the field of fundamental rights. As the EU requires that 
States that want to enter the EU are Contracting Parties to the ECHR, it 
seems odd that the EU is not a Contracting Party to the Convention itself.  
In my view, the finalized version of the Draft agreement succeeds in 
preserving the autonomy of EU law as well as the autonomy of CJEU and 
the ECtHR’s jurisdictions. Firstly, the prior involvement mechanism is an 
apt solution to allow the CJEU to assess (and if necessary, declare invalid) 
EU acts before the ECtHR declare EU law in violation of the ECHR. This 
mechanism resembles the preliminary ruling-procedure between the 
domestic courts of the EU Member States and the CJEU. The preliminary 
ruling-procedure constitutes a key feature of the EU’s legal setup and the 
prior involvement mechanism therefore seems to match the requirements set 
out in Protocol 8. TEU relating to Art. 6(2). Moreover, the prior 
involvement mechanism succeeds in preserving the CJEU’s key functions, 
as defined in Art. 19 TEU and 267 TFEU. Due to this mechanism, accession 
will not lead to disruption of the Foto-Frost doctrine, according to which the 
CJEU is the only court that can declare EU measures invalid. As far as I am 
concerned, it is not unjust that no similar solution is available for the courts 
of the other Contracting Parties, as the preliminary ruling procedure 
constitutes a unique element of the EU legal order, which is necessary in 
order to preserve the CJEU’s key functions. However, it is important that 
the proceedings before the ECtHR, which are already extremely time-
consuming, are not disproportionately prolonged. Secondly, the co-
respondent mechanism is also an acceptable solution that preserves the 
autonomy of the EU legal order, as it doesn’t require the ECtHR to assess 
the content of EU law, the EU Member States responsibilities under EU law 
or decide exactly where the alleged violation occurred. Moreover, it is 
preferable to the existing Art. 36 ECHR on Third-Party interventions as it 
requires the co-respondent to intervene, which Art. 36 ECHR does not. 
Thirdly, the choice to include the EU and its Member States in the current 
Inter-party-state clause set out in Art. 33 ECHR, is a convenient solution, as 
it places the EU on equal footing with the other Contracting Parties. At the 
same time, it preserves the autonomy of the EU legal order as the EU and its 
Member States will be able to exclude such complaints from the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction by way of agreement under Art. 55 ECHR, a solution is open to 
all Contracting Parties. Hence, it does not favour the EU above the other 47 
Member States. Additionally, the solution provided for in Inter-Party 
complaints is compatible with Art. 344. TFEU which precludes Member 
States from initiating proceedings before other courts than the EU Courts, for 
the purpose of settling disputes relating to EU law. Lastly, the ECtHR is 
highly unlikely to continue to grant the EU with the Bosphorus-presumption 
as it would be extremely unjust to the other Contracting Parties, complicate 
proceedings to which the EU is co-respondent and it contradicts the explicit 
requirement in the Accession agreement that the EU shall accede on equal 
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footing with the other Contracting Parties.  The finalized version of the 
Draft agreement is currently subject to an opinion by the CJEU. It will 
indeed be interesting to see whether the CJEU, the institution that is the 
most fanatical defender of the autonomy of EU law and, naturally, its own 
jurisdiction, has to say on whether the latest version of the Draft agreement 
comply with the Treaties. Considering that the negotiations on accession 
have been going on for over thirty years, one must hope that the Court 
considers the last Draft agreement compatible with the Treaties so the thirty 
year long negotiations on the EU’s accession to the ECHR are not delayed 
further.  
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